History of Samarkand. A brief history of one of the oldest cities in the world and Uzbekistan - the city of Samarkand Capture of Samarkand by Russian troops

The defense of Samarkand, as one of the outstanding events in Central Asia, deserves full attention from everyone who is interested in the affairs of our Turkestan region. We boldly say “everyone”, because it represents an important moment in the history of Russian conquests in the East. Pointing out the situation that accompanied this event, recalling many, even minor, episodes related to it - a matter, in our opinion, is not only not superfluous, but necessary. After all, only a detailed study of the subject gives an accurate concept of it; after all, only the clarification of trifles can give real illumination to an accomplished fact. In military affairs, this is especially important. Here often the most insignificant incident, the impulse of one person, a happy resourcefulness, change the situation to such an extent that completely unexpected results are obtained. There are many facts to confirm what has been said, but they are more or less known to everyone, but we mention their meaning, meaning to explain the purpose of these notes on the defense of Samarkand. But since something has already been said on this subject, we consider it necessary to make some reservations. Reading the article by Mr. Cherkasov “Defending Samarkand in 1868” and “Essays on military operations in 1868 in the Zaryavshan Valley” by Mr. Lyko, we came across such thoughts with which we cannot agree. Far from becoming, in relation to the articles mentioned, on critical ground, or presenting our opinion as immutable, we only wish to point out some details otherwise understood by us. The opinions we intend to express may be wrong, the facts

Since 1854, i.e. from the time it was decided to unite the Orenburg and Siberian borders, and when clashes between our troops and the Central Asians began to occur, in the intervals between offensive skirmishes in the field and storming of cities, the Russians had to act defensively, moreover, the enemy, who in such cases had a huge numerical superiority , sometimes inflicted considerable damage on us (the case of Serov near Ikan). In all such clashes, we successfully used the superiority of our firearms, which allowed us to emerge victorious from a difficult situation. In addition, our dense, disciplined troops showed a clear superiority over the disorganized crowds of Muslims, in which panic developed at the first energetic offensive of the Russians. After many setbacks, the Asians finally got used to considering us invincible and fled from the battlefield after the first, for the most part, insufficiently stubborn resistance. Only the extreme fanaticism aroused against us forced them sometimes, after the most capital pogrom, such as, for example, the Irjar, to take up arms again.

It is clear that the fight against such an enemy could not, strictly speaking, be a good school for the Russian troops operating in Central Asia. A number of risky and extremely happy undertakings (the assault on Tashkent, the Irdzhar case ...) gave rise to contempt for the enemy forces in them. The opinion emerged, shared by people who enjoy a well-deserved military reputation in Turkestan, that in dealing with the Central Asians, any precautions (in the sense of ensuring communications with the rear, etc.) are, if not superfluous, then not necessary. that one has only to go forward - and everything will work out as well as possible. How fair this view is, is left to judge for everyone. For our part, we consider it necessary to point out only one circumstance, which, in our opinion, is very important. It is known that the people of Bukhara on the Zyrabulak heights were no longer the same as they fought

The siege of Samarkand, closely connected with the event of June 2, is, on the one hand, the result of an excellently conceived deception, by the execution of which the enemy could put us in the most critical, let's say More, hopeless situation; on the other hand, it represents in itself a fact that goes beyond the ordinary, as we have already noted above.

In a word, the lessons given to the enemy before 1868 did not go unnoticed for him. He learned a lot, stopped blindly relying on one superiority of forces and began to use them in a more rational way. As a result, in the year mentioned, he is already an adversary deserving a certain respect. Concerning the last circumstance, we will allow ourselves to remind the reader of some details.

The most advanced point that we occupied in 1868, in the month of May, was Kata-Kurgan; at that time there were 13 1/2 infantry companies (1,500 people), three hundred Cossacks (270 people) and 12 guns in it. For other points, our troops were then distributed as follows:

At the main point of all our operations in the newly conquered region, in Samarkand, there were eleven companies of infantry (1,200 people), two hundred Cossacks and eight guns; on the way of communication with Tashkent: in Yany Kurgan, two companies, in Jizzakh, a battalion; the troops stationed in Chinaz, Tashkent and other places could not help the active detachment in case of emergency, and therefore we do not mention them.

The distance between the mentioned points is as follows; between Kata-Kurgan

The enemy had from 30 to 40,000 on the Zyrabulak heights, between Bukhara and Kata Kurgan, twelve versts ahead of the latter, where all the forces of the emir had gathered, and 20 thousand from the Kara-Tube side. To this we must add the inhabitants of the region occupied by us, who, at the first opportunity, were ready to rise up without exception. The Shahrisyab people were especially dangerous. The movement of the units of the active detachment to Urgut and Kara-Tube, although they were successful in the tactical sense, did not reach their main purpose - to ensure Samarkand from this warlike tribe. Separated from the Zaryavshan valley by a mountain range, it held itself completely independently, was proud of its independence and, with the help of Bukhara, hoped to successfully compete with the Russian troops. This hope was even stronger after the movement of part of the detachment to Kara-Tube, which was interpreted by the Shakhrisyab people in their favor.

The division of the Russian troops, the exaggerated soreness in them, the hopes for the support of the population, all encouraged the enemy to take bolder actions. To this end, the leader of the Shakhrisyab people, together with the emir, drew up a plan that deserves attention. It was decided, by attacking Kata-Kurgan, to call the main Russian forces into the field, to lure, without accepting a battle, as far as possible into the possessions of Bukhara, and, meanwhile, to strike at Samarkand and take possession of it. The emir had to fulfill the first: his task was, as far as possible, to delay the decisive moment of the clash with the Russians; the second part of the plan - the capture of Samarkand - was to be carried out by the people of Shakhrisyab. After capturing Samarkand, it was supposed, with combined forces, to act against the detachment moving towards Bukhara, and on its communications with Tashkent. Thus, the capture of Samarkand became the main goal of the enterprise and, as a means of decisively changing the position of the Russians in the theater of war, was to serve as a signal for a general uprising, perhaps, of the entire Turkestan population.

It is obvious that Samarkand, during the hostilities of 1868, had a paramount role; it is obvious that at this moment, for the whole of Central Asia, not to mention the Russian possessions, he was to become a heart, the beating of which could not but resonate throughout the whole organism.

The enemy's considerations were very sound. The Russians, occupying Samarkand and Kata-Kurgan at the end of May, have not yet dealt a decisive blow to either the Bukharans or the Shakhrisyabians. Both of them still possessed considerable means for the struggle. The first, as has already been noted, stood near Kata-Kurgan, disturbing the detachment located in it; the second concentrated between Kara-Tyube and Samarkand, threatening our rear in the event of offensive operations. The position of the Russians was becoming critical. It was possible to get out of it only by means of a decisive blow, and, moreover, a blow directed at the most sensitive point of the enemy disposition. Where was this point? Obviously, in Bukhara, where the main leader of the military operations against us nestled, where his funds were concentrated. A decisive blow should have been directed here. And for this it was necessary, sparing no means, to form in Samarkand such a stronghold, which, with the most limited garrison, would be completely safe from any attempt on the part of the enemy, while the rest of the troops were moving towards Bukhara. It would, in our opinion, not be too difficult to bring Samarkand into a position that meets the stated need. To do this, it would be necessary, immediately after his occupation, to form an esplanade near the walls of the citadel, from the side of the city, to lay in the walls (albeit in haste, in clods) a number of small, but very harmful, in a defensive sense, landslides, to pour, where possible , barbets, and break through, in the existing towers, loopholes. The time from May 2 to May 30 was absolutely enough for this, especially if, to help the troops tired of the transitions, civilian workers were attached. However, if there were not enough time, then the main forces' action against the emir, perhaps, would not interfere with postponing for eight days, and in eight days a lot can be done. The emir at that time would not have increased his hordes so much as to stop ours; troops. However, we are talking about the postponement of the detachment’s march to Bukhara as an extreme, to which, using twenty-eight

We have indicated in part what should have been done for the defense of Samarkand, and what was done on this subject, the reader can see from Mr. Cherkasov's article. We consider it not superfluous to cite the opinion of Mr. Lyko, expressed by him in "Essays on military operations", when assessing various circumstances of the defense. This assessment “cannot,” says the author, “not lead us to regret that excessive confidence in the inhabitants of the city was the reason that the commandant refrained from destroying the dwellings adjacent to the walls of the citadel, and from clearing the necessary esplanade: this, depriving the garrison of the opportunity to hit enemies with well-aimed fire, made the attacks prolonged, stubborn, and the shooting at the garrison was continuous, deadly and almost unpunished. Let us make a few remarks.

From the plan attached by Mr. Cherkasov to the article “Protection of Samarkand” (to which Mr. Lyko also refers), it is clear that part of the defensive fence of the citadel, where the sakli stretched directly behind the wall, extends for half a mountain of a verst. It is known that the Asians build their dwellings quite closely and leave the streets narrow, therefore, in order to form an esplanade for a mile and a half, at least 300 sakels would have to be broken, which would require major work and a lot of time, with a small number of people available. Baron Shtempel.

It seems to us that such work was beyond the power of the Samarkand commandant. He had to: 1) take care of supplying the citadel with water, which he did and which required both time and hands; 2.) cut off the sole of the sloping wall, where it represented a full opportunity for an escalade; 3) to pour two barbettes (the capital nature of this work, taking into account the three-yard height of the embankment being erected, is obvious), which again required both time and hands; 4) to clear the communication between different points of the citadel ... Whoever did the work will understand that in some two days with 658 people of the garrison it is difficult to do all of the above, while maintaining guards at the same time. We believe that the commandant could not even think about clearing the esplanade. So it seems to us that the reproach made by Mr. Lyko to the commandant, if it can be a reproach, is not to Baron Shtempel.

However, be that as it may, the esplanades were not cleared, many breaches were not laid, and the garrison had to substitute

On May 1, as is known, the action took place on the Chapan-Atyn heights, adjacent directly to the Samarkand gardens in the place where the road to Tashkent emerges from them. It was believed that Chapan-ata was the advanced position of the enemy, where he wanted to give field work so that later, with a high probability of success, he could stand outside the walls of Samarkand. Whether the commanders of the emir thought so, giving battle to the city of Samarkand, or they counted on the impregnability of the position, due to the spilled Zaryavshan, and considered it possible to give a proper rebuff to the Russians, not allowing them to reach the city, it is rather difficult to say definitively. Perhaps the latter is more likely, because the Bukharians strongly hoped for their position, while it was rather difficult to count on the defense of the city. The reasons for the latter circumstance are obvious. The city walls, as we will see later, were in a very deplorable state: there were no places for placing guns on them; and most importantly - after the assault, if one had followed, there would have been an inevitable ram, which would have ruined the inhabitants, without bringing any benefit to the emir.

So, we were met at Chapan-ata. The matter did not last long ... The enemy fled, leaving in our hands almost all the artillery and the camp, in which we found a lot of different rubbish: tents, rugs, felts, various utensils, and most of all dressing gowns and boots (chegov) abandoned by the brave troops of the emir , for the sake of ease of running when leaving position. Thanks to this measure, the enemy retreated very quickly, so that, having ascended the heights, we saw only the heels of the fleeing flickering in the distance.

In the same fact - in the surrender of Samarkand without a fight - many saw the beginning of a cunningly conceived plan. It is also difficult to agree with this. The plan of action we have already mentioned came much later. In a hot moment, there could be no talk of him.

We have expanded a little on this, because the question itself is quite important. Its correct resolution provides a means of forming a correct conception of the subsequent events of the region, and indirectly of the extent to which the battle of May 1 had a decisive character. In any case, the surrender of Samarkand without a fight put its inhabitants in an inviolable position.

On May 2, the Russians moved into the city. With songs and music, we passed the streets, on both sides of which came across

The detachment settled down outside the city, along the Bukhara road. Part was left in the citadel. Everyone rejoiced at the opportunity to rest and recover. The tedious marches across the hungry steppe, and especially the reinforced march and then the battle on May 1, required a stop. In addition, it was necessary not only to strengthen in Samarkand, but also to extend power to the surrounding areas in order to have support in the further struggle. It was also necessary to arrange a secured communication with Tashkent. That is why it was decided to stop in Samarkand for a rest. Samarkand was the most convenient for this. Its luxurious gardens, beautiful spring water, the ability to get it necessary for the troops, could not but be to the taste of the detachment. Except. these, so to speak, purely material considerations. Samarkand attracted educated people with its sights, and although one could only point to the colossal mosques built under Tamerlane, this was enough for lovers of antiquity.

The city itself was no different from other cities. Central Asia. The same narrow streets, on both sides of which stretch low clay huts with flat roofs; the same bazaar as everywhere else, with shops open on the street where you can find native and imported goods; the same unbearable dust in dry weather, and inaccessible mud during rains; you come across the same dressing gowns in multi-colored or white turbans and women in dressing gowns thrown over their heads and with their faces covered - in a word, everything is the same as in Tashkent, Chemkent and other cities ... The city is surrounded by clay a wall that had collapsed in places and presented completely prepared breaches. For defense, she was not adapted; Apparently, they didn't think about it. Embracing the entire almost built-up space of the city and making up a significant stretch in length, this wall required a large number of troops for its occupation, therefore, it could not, in the future, serve as a Russian support, even if proper

Mr. Cherkasov's article "Defending Samarkand in 1868", it seems to us, did not sufficiently explain two very important questions: 1) when Samarkand, during the seven-day siege, was in the greatest danger? and 2) where was the weakest point of our location, where the enemy was supposed to direct the most energetic blows? To not give oneself a direct and definite answer to these questions means to enumerate a multitude of episodes in a certain order without elucidating their inner content; to mix individual, more or less fragmentary, efforts of the enemy with an assault on his 3rd, in which all forces participated at once and which was undertaken by the Shahrisyab people, as the last decisive blow before retreating into the mountains; in short: it means not to get a picture of the general course of the siege.

A direct solution of the proposed issues is also important in another respect: on the one hand, it will indicate the leading role that the people of Shahrisyab played during the siege, on the other hand, it can justify a significant concentration of defenders at the Bukhara Gates. We have always thought that the latter circumstance was entirely justified. To be convinced of this, you need to look at the location of the citadel and the meaning of its various points. The citadel is located in the northwestern part of the city (see drawing). In plan, it has a polygonal outline with two large incoming parts facing west. The hill on which the citadel is built generally commands the city and the surrounding gardens. From its highest point, from the location of the kok-tash (Khan's palace), you can see a significant part of the city. The wall surrounding the citadel reaches up to two fathoms in thickness and up to four fathoms in height. In it, at a fairly close distance from one another, semi-towers protruding outward are arranged. These are monolithic clay masses, on which, along the height of the wall, thin walls are folded; the latter can be occupied by 10-12 shooters. The half-towers, due to the insignificance of their release due to the outer line of the fence, could not deliver the last flank defense, so that the strength of the Samarkand citadel could only be the height of the surrounding

The Gates of Bukhara were not in such a position (see the devil). Built less capitally, but according to the same plan as Samarkand, they did not have any barrier in front of them and access to them was completely free; in addition, the wall adjoining directly to the gate was incomparably more in a worse position than the same wall near the Samarkand gate. On the right side, at the very gates, it represented, as it were, a gap built up with sacks. Sakli, located inside the citadel, had windows and doors on the roofs of the sakli, built directly behind them in the city, so that, having climbed the latter, it was already easy to get into the interior of the citadel. Somewhat further behind the mentioned sakli, the front to the Bukhara road was a wide gap, which was very easy to climb. On the left side of the gate, the defensive fence also collapsed significantly and in one place was no higher than two arshins. Here, steps were even made on the outside, which served as a good communication route for dogs and people, at a time when the gates were locked. Having ascended from the city along these steps, it was possible to take possession of the left tower, and from it it was free to enter the citadel. Thus, in the smallest extent, in fact

To all that has been said, other circumstances must be added that made it difficult to defend the Bukhara Gates. The road to the city, leaving the gate, turned rather sharply to the right, so that the gun placed here could fire at the most insignificant space in front; consequently, it was easy for the attacker to approach him, with complete impunity, at the closest distance. All together made the Bukhara Gate the weakest point, and it is not surprising that the enemy attacked here more energetically than anywhere else.

The interior of the citadel was divided by narrow and crooked streets, which could greatly contribute to shelter from shots from the city. At first, they thought not to take possession of all the buildings located in the citadel, but to divide the latter into two parts by a wide street: one to give to the garrison, the other to those residents who owned the sakli in this part. For this purpose, it was necessary to build a street from the Samarkand Gates to the western incoming corner of the defensive wall and assign the southern part of the citadel to the natives, the northern garrison. The idea of ​​dividing the citadel into two halves, Russian and Muslim, had humane beginnings: by selecting only half of the sakels built in the citadel, and not all, for the garrison, we deprived the property of two times fewer people and, consequently, made the inhabitants twice as easy. But there were also minor inconveniences in the fulfillment of such a plan: it was difficult to guarantee that the sakli would be occupied by such personalities. whose views and intentions would be well known to the garrison: it was even more difficult to say that frequent quarrels and major misunderstandings would not occur between the garrison and its close neighbors, separated by one street. Such inconveniences, perhaps minor and repulsive in peacetime, became quite important during the siege. Imagine that the fortress, defended by the French from a German attack, is half occupied by the Germans. Will it be good for the French? All these inconveniences were probably well understood by the people of Samarkand, because the separated part of the citadel was not occupied by anyone. From the intention to divide the citadel into parts, only one trace remained - a wide street or esplanade, as it was called. During the siege, the esplanade had some disadvantages: it

In a very short time, the city began to fill up. Near the camp, a temporary bazaar was formed with the most necessary items: cakes, dumplings, various vegetables, unripe fruits, gingerbread, nuts. A lively activity boiled here, trade opened.

Near the basket with cakes is a soldier. - “Hey, tamyr (1),” he says very seriously, being convinced that his knowledge in the native language is completely sufficient: - “tamyr, how much does a bir (2) cake cost? no need for humpty-baltai."

- "Uh, tamyre," he says, not understanding what was going on. “Here is a cake,” the soldier explains, poking his finger into the basket: “bir cake, how much?”

In another place, having nothing to do, an artilleryman is talking with a green apricot (apricot) merchant. - “Urus sarbaz - yakshi (3), Samarkand - yaman (4). Urus-sarbaz will give maklash (5) to your sarbaz. And now they gave you all haman (6).

- "Aman, aman," says the Sart, nodding his head approvingly. - "Now you are a merchant, well, trade: satu (7) is possible."

Everything took on the appearance of a somewhat original camp life. Only the smoking wicks by the guns reminded the detachment of its purpose. The time dragged on monotonously.

Expeditions to Chilek and Urgut greatly diversified our bivouac life. Hopes for further skirmishes and differences made them willingly endure many inconveniences. They talked about the movement to Bukhara. A lot of guessing, thinking, arguing. The movement to the emir's capital was considered positively necessary. Few people doubted the possibility and feasibility of this enterprise.

Finally, we moved forward to Kata-Kurgan, with the aim of taking this point and stopping at it. For this purpose, a company, 3 hundred and 12 guns were sent there, under the command of General Golovachev. Hopes for an assault on the city, which, as was known, were occupied by the enemy, revived the detachment. Despite the southern

A beautiful picture spread out before us. In a small valley, bordered on the side of Bukhara by the elevated bank of the Narpay, luxurious gardens stretched, which, in the direction of Zaryavshan, occupied an increasingly large strip. Between the trees, as if showing off their luxurious clothes, thick-leaved elms stood out, and near, leaving peaks in the sky, slender poplars flaunted. Right there, next to these two beautiful plants of the south, fruit trees modestly crowded, allowing the first to show their beauty and grandeur even more. Here and there peeped out of the dense greenery were city huts and earthen walls, built, as usual, on both sides of the streets. The huts, the gardens, and the hills that stretched further on were illuminated by the bright morning sun, which gave everything an extremely picturesque look. But there was no time to admire them. Many hearts beat in anticipation of a shot from the city. Arbachs settled down not far from the troops and stroked their beards with pleasure in anticipation of a harvest. One of them, still dear, kept asking if the Russians would storm the city. At the same time, he usually lowered his voice and made a serious face. What was his indignation when it became known that the Emir's soldiers left Kata-Kurgan just before our arrival, and the inhabitants sent a deputation? The detachment occupied the city and settled down on the left bank of the Narpay, near the road leading to Bukhara. This part of the country is a completely bare slope facing the river. Ahead, parallel to the front of the disposition of troops, was the ridge of the hill; from it it was possible to survey a considerable space towards the side of the enemy.

At first, only on the right, and then on the left bank of the Narpai, the city itself is located. A small fortress was built in the middle; it can be defended by one company. This is the so-called citadel. It all fit on a natural hillock, which has four sazhens heights above the surrounding gardens. The slopes of the mound are completely sheer. A wide stone staircase leads to the gates of the citadel. The citadel served as a quarter for the Kata-Kurgan bek and his entourage.

In Kata-Kurgan, the emir's garden is remarkable. Better than this garden, we did not happen to see either in Samarkand or in Tashkent.

An almost square space about 50 sazhens aside is planted with poplars, elm and fruit trees: a pond is dug in the middle, filled with water through grooves or, as they are called here, ditches; from the pond there are alleys planted on both sides with grapes, which, rising along the trellises, form a dense green canopy over the alleys with hanging bunches of fruit. Full shade in the garden. Toward the side of the citadel, the garden is lined with buildings. These are the former premises of the emir during his stay in Kata-Kurgan: a small harem, two small reception rooms connected to each other by an open gallery, and various services with a courtyard behind them. From the gallery, the emir could view both the garden and the courtyard at the same time. Here he showed himself to the people who had gathered to bow and received the beks.

The garden was occupied by General Golovachev and his staff. From here to the camp located on the other side of the Narpai, about a verst.

In the twentieth of May, the first enemy attack was made on the troops stationed at Kata-Kurgan. A small gang of horsemen attacked the detachment pack camels and intended to steal them. Hit the alarm. The troops quickly gathered in alarm rushed. pursue the attackers. There was a small skirmish and a fight with the Cossacks. The camels were recaptured. An hour later, everything calmed down in the camp again.

Meanwhile, on May 27, part of the troops was sent from Samarkand to Kara-Tube. The village, occupied by the people of Shakhrisyab, defended itself very stubbornly. We suffered significant damage and, retreating to Samarkand, could only say that we had defeated the enemy, but not just so that he would not dare to accompany us on the way back.

A similar outcome of the case, and at the same time the news from Kata-Kurgan that attacks on the detachment stationed there were repeated more and more stubbornly and on a larger and larger scale, required decisive measures. It was decided, leaving the 6th battalion and 100 sappers with two battery guns in Samarkand, to move all the other troops to Kata-Kurgan, and, joining General Golovachev’s detachment there, follow the road to Bukhara and defeat the emir, who, as it was It is known that with all his strength he stood on Zyrabulak.

On May 31, the commander of the troops set out for Kata-Kurgan. The garrison left in Samarkand was extremely upset that he would have to sit idly by, while others would

At the same time, from the side of the road in Kara-Tube, Shakhrisyab residents appeared. Every now and then new information came about. In the north, in the direction of the Chelek road, dust also appeared, and in general a lively movement of horse and foot people was noticed. It became obvious that Samarkand was surrounded by significant forces. What consequences could result from this could be partly judged by the mood of the inhabitants.

Even the day before, driving through the city, it was easy to notice a special emptiness in the streets. The young and old seem to have never been here. If you came across residents - always in groups, near the mosque, then they were all young and strong subjects capable of handling cartoons or batik.

When passing by such a gathering, it was useful not to pay attention to the fact that the lively conversation that had been carried on up to that time ceased. The stern faces and the impudent look of the faithful showed that between them ripening towards the Russians - if not already ripe - an extreme dislike, followed by an open uprising. And: and such a crowd, during the passage of a Russian, large curses were already heard, uttered, although not quite loudly, but rather

On the morning of the 2nd, the commandant, listening to the insistent requests of several residents who wanted the Russians to protect the city from the invasion of the Shahrisyabians, with two companies and two guns moved to the Hadji-Arar Gates, where, according to the same Sarts, the enemy accumulated in significant numbers. forces. Having passed through the empty streets of the city and approaching the gates, we believed that our mere presence would force the enemy, if there really was one, to retreat. We were wrong. The column had just pulled out of the Haji Arar Gates, shots rang out from the gardens, at first rare, then more and more frequent. Scattered shooters. They put a gun on a hill and fired two grenades into the gardens. The firefight intensified. Our position was very disadvantageous. We had to more or less group on the road, on both sides of which stretched rather high walls, which did not allow us to see everything that was happening in the gardens. On the contrary, the enemy, hiding in the gardens, could surround us and cause significant harm. Therefore, we retreated, occupied the gates, closed them and scattered the shooters behind the battlements of the walls. It was clear that the enemy was getting stronger. We have, despite our closed position, a few people out of action. At last the huts and gardens in front of the gate were filled with the enemy. Separate individuals rushed to the walls occupied by us. One daredevil, dissatisfied with the sack, from which he initially shot from his cartoon, began to make his way to the gate. A soldier standing behind the battlements noticed this and fired. The wounded Sart first fell, but then got up again and took up his gun. - "Hurry, brethren!" he shouted, in broken Russian.

Having spread to the right and to the left, the enemy could cut us off from the citadel, and therefore the commandant ordered us to retreat to the citadel. Our retreat was the signal for the attack. Everything that until that time had been kept at a respectful distance rushed to Samarkand. The enemy realized his strength, and from that moment the struggle was to take on a serious character.

We dare not say that Baron Stempel must not

As soon as we had time, as they say, to get out, the citadel was immediately surrounded and the porridge was brewed.

The enemy, following directly behind the retreating companies and then spreading to the right and left, rushed straight to storm the walls and gates. The first push was terrible. The most rapid fire directed at the citadel; desperate attempts to seize the cemetery with open force, scratching at coolness with the help of so-called cats; a friendly onslaught on the Samarkand and Bukhara gates, which had just managed to close; the menacing, incessant cries of the besiegers, from whose side zurns were played, drums were beaten, the trumpet rattled - all this was only the beginning ....... For each of us, these were the most difficult minutes.

As soon as we arrived at the Samarkand Gates, a non-commissioned officer ran up.

- “Your honor! broke in!"

- “Here, now,” he said, choking ... “there is no one there ......

Appropriate orders are made; people run in the indicated direction, rush to the gap, overturn the enemy into the city, climb the wall in order to be able to shoot back; many of them fall back and rise no more, their place is taken by others.

So, from the other side, a Russian “cheers” is heard, a shot is heard, another. The rattling of the guns gets louder and louder. Screams are heard again, this time not Russian; then everything merges into a general rumble and din, among which nothing can be disassembled. Increasingly, the wounded and the dead are being dragged along. The enemy is pushing harder and harder.

At about two o'clock, the enemy, having opened fire near the very Samarkand

Right here. only a little closer to the Bukhara Gates, the besieger began to actively cut off the wall, in the hope of causing a collapse. We heard his work clearly. To prevent the production of these works, by order of Captain Mikhnevich, a ladder was placed against the wall so that hand grenades could be thrown at the work from it. The gunners got used to it very quickly. One of them, almost Mikhnevich himself, played a very funny joke with the enemy: standing on the stairs and holding a prepared grenade in his hands, he called out to the Sarts who were working on the other side of the wall. The knocking of the ketmens subsided, the enemy listened. - "Here's a present for you," the joker shouted, throwing a grenade over the wall: "eat!" Curses were heard and several stones flew over the wall. Apparently, they did not like the meal. The one who proposed it was very pleased. Similar jokes were repeated, and almost always with the same success. In general, hand grenades, not only here, but also at other points, brought enormous benefits to the garrison. They were used on time and with full knowledge of the matter. Of course, it was not without curiosities, as we will see later. But the curiosities, funny in themselves, were nothing more than particulars and were lost in the general, which was far from comforting.

By the evening of the 2nd, Lieutenant Colonel Nazarov, with a weak ninth battalion and 100 sappers, was sent to the Bukhara Gates, where the enemy directed more and more efforts

When Lieutenant Colonel Nazarov arrived at the Bukhara Gates, they presented a striking picture. Produced here by the enemy

The hunters-sappers called in tore off the burning curtains of the gates and made a blockage from the bags, behind which the gun was placed from the torn sheets and the ceiling that then collapsed in front of the blockage, a fire was formed that burned until the morning of the next day. The enemy tried to keep the fire going. We happened to see how a ten-year-old Sart boy, hiding from our shots with a ledge of the tower, threw firewood and chips on the fire at the very time when we were making a blockage a few steps from the daredevil.

In the city, near the enemy, there was the busiest traffic and noise. His militant cry was echoed by drums, zurns and a terribly roaring trumpet, calling the faithful to battle. In a large stone mosque, opposite the Bukhara Gates, the leader of the Shahrisabians, Jura-biy, made a holiday (tamasha) in honor of the successful course of the siege. We heard the sounds of tambourine and zurn entertaining the dignitaries of Kitab. The enemy, having not yet done anything decisive, was already triumphant and behaved extremely boldly. Every now and then people on foot and even on horseback flashed past the opening of the gate; about a hundred paces from the citadel, near the pond, several Sarts made a fire and settled down, having cooked pilau, to have supper and rest after the day's work. From the right tower of the gate you can (it hurts to see this group, illuminated by a blazing fire. One of the officers of the 9th battalion, having climbed one of the sakels located directly at the very gates, with 6-7 soldiers fired a volley into the robes and dispersed them.

The dark southern night has come. As if illuminated, the city and the citadel were ablaze with fire: there was a most frequent exchange of fire, and cannon shots were heard from the barbettes of the citadel. Clearly, none of us thought about sleep, It was beginning to get light. The enemy moved somewhat away from the walls and gathered strength. The shots from his side thinned out, although they did not stop during the whole night. There was a calm for three or four hours, after which, everyone felt it, a hurricane should come.

From seven or eight o'clock, the shooting began to flare up. The enemy fumbled. Busy traffic and running around were noticeable along the streets of the city. At times, at the very walls of the citadel, in the general noise, one could distinguish the orders made by the enemy and the orders given. Sarts were preparing for the assault.

Soon, as on the eve, the Shahrisyab trumpet roared, zurns began to play, drums beat. Enemy with ur cry! (bey) threw himself on the walls of the citadel. His arrows, seated in high two-story shacks, inflicted enormous damage on the garrison. A hail of stones rained down on the defenders from three sides. With difficulty, they managed to remove the wounded and the dead and replace their places. In particular, the people who occupied the sakli on the right side of the gate endured. Here, as has already been noted, the windows and doors opened onto the roofs of the city sakels, climbing on which it was already easy for the enemy to get into the citadel. At twenty minutes past ten the aforementioned saklis were occupied by him; a friendly onslaught was made on the gates and the bags covering them were scattered; part of the wall to the left of the gate also passed into the hands of the besiegers, who fired almost point-blank at the defenders; our gunners, by accident, loaded the gun with gunpowder to the muzzle - no shot was fired; our people recoiled and crowded in the street leading to Kok-tash. Two or three people from among the attackers rushed to the abandoned gun and grabbed its wheels. A formidable moment came: our soldiers stood still, shouted hurray and died ... The courage of Lieutenant Colonel Nazarov and the personal example of Ensign Vereshchagin corrected the matter. The latter, with a gun in his hands, at the head of several people, rushed into the hut, occupied by the enemy, and knocked him over with bayonets into the city; the rest unanimously hit the gate. The enemy could not withstand the onslaught: panic seized him, and several of our men who jumped out of the gate fired at the fleeing.

The morning of June 3 will long remain in the memory of those who were at the Bukhara Gates that day. To this day, certain episodes are extremely vividly recalled to us, as if everything that had happened had happened very recently. It is especially difficult to forget the Handmaid. At the very beginning of the assault, he was not at the Bukhara Gates, but he came to them at the very moment when his subordinates so unsuccessfully loaded the gun and backed away from it. Sluzhenko was riding a dark brown horse and wearing a white tunic. The expression on his face was

The fate of this officer is remarkable. Almost at the beginning of his service in the Turkestan region, he was captured in Bukhara, he endured there for quite a long time, suffered a lot of grief and hardship, which it was even difficult for him to talk about. The maid, despite his reserved and somewhat unsociable nature, was loved by everyone and was extremely upset by his death.

I also remember Nazarov, whose presence at the Bukhara Gates on the 3rd was of such great importance for the defense: he was in a yellow silk shirt, with a cover on his head instead of a cap and in shoes, a Caucasian saber over his shoulder, a revolver in his belt. "Forward guys! Behind me!" he shouts to the soldiers with his energetic voice...

And here is the bugler of the sapper company: he trumpets the offensive and blushed like a cancer from the effort; taking the horn from his mouth, he says to his comrades in a plaintive, breathless voice: "What are you, brothers?..." mouth half open, lips dry and white; he clings to his comrades and does not even scream ....... One of the soldiers reads the Mother of God ....... The Ural Cossack complains about his fate ... “They take the gun, they take the gun, you can hear it in the back rows .. .” - “Who is with me, guys, come here!” says Vereshchagin; his face is pale, his eyes are burning; he has an open head, his hair flutters in the wind ...

But the picture has changed. The enemy retreated. We rest. Someone said that a detachment was coming to our rescue. A loud, joyful "cheers" is heard between the defenders. A team is formed, which must go towards the detachment. Vesky wants to be in its ranks. Tired faces perked up....... The news turned out to be wrong. Again the picture is changing.

No matter how hard it was for the defenders who stood directly at

About noon we noticed something unusual in the city. There was some turmoil going on; terrible dust rose from running around, screams were heard. The enemy supported the skirmish with the citadel very weakly. Only in the evening did we find out what it all meant. It turned out that the people of Shakhrisyab, who had learned about the defeat of the emir at Zyrabulak on the 2nd, launched the third, last desperate assault, which was supposed to decide the fate of Samarkand. Failing, they decided to retreat. Why did the emir, contrary to the previously accepted

With their departure, our situation has changed significantly for the better. The enemy weakened, at least by half, because the people of Shakhrisyab were distinguished by relatively serviceable weapons and a warlike spirit. We, for our part, looked around somewhat and began to get used to our position. Previous assaults have pointed out to us points that require the best protection, and found out the reason for the advantage that the besieger had over the defender. The reason was that there was no gap between the wall of the citadel and the city, as a result of which the enemy could secretly approach the citadel, occupy the highest sacks near it and, breaking through loopholes in them, at 25-30 paces of distance, surely beat every soldier forced protrude from behind the wall or stand against a wide, hastily punched loophole in order to act on the besieger. In order to destroy the disastrous value of the sakels located near the citadel, and on the other hand, to entertain the soldiers and plant greater confidence in their strength, on the 3rd of the evening, at the initiative of Lieutenant Colonel Nazarov, a sortie was made from the Bukhara Gate, which ended very successfully.

Thus, after the departure of the Shakhrisyab people, the nature of the defense changed: instead of defending every point of the defensive fence with huge losses and not daring to think about any enterprise outside it, from the evening of the 3rd, we begin to make sorties, which is already clearly proves a significant change in the situation. From this it can be seen that the eight-day siege of Samarkand can be divided into two acts: the day of the 2nd and half of the 3rd - the most difficult and serious time of defense, which had tremendous moral significance for the garrison - the first act; the next days, when I had to think mainly about whether or not there would be enough water in the ponds and salt in the warehouses - the second.

We usually got ready for our trips before dark. The soldiers collected straw, small chips, took several packs of matches. Kindling was tied in bunches and put on bayonets. When it got dark, they pushed back the door that closed the hole between the bags,

It was produced by Nazarov from the Samarkand Gates. It was three o'clock in the afternoon. The enemy kept up a lively exchange of fire with our men who occupied the gates. Nazarov ordered to make three shots of cannonballs at the nearest sacks from the cannon standing here, after which, having formed a team, he led it to the city. At the very first steps, we stumbled upon the enemy, who, apparently, did not expect an attack and began to hastily retreat into the depths of the city. While chasing him and pushing him further towards the bazaar, we lit the sakli in the meantime.

On this day, it was planned to go around the citadel in the direction of the Bukhara Gates and try to burn the sakli so as to form continuous ruins in front of the citadel wall, between the Samarkand and Bukhara gates, where the enemy held on especially tightly and from where they caused us a lot of harm. The goal, this time, although not quite, but was achieved.

Vereshchagin and the merchant Trubchaninov took part in the sortie. The latter completely entered the role of the most fierce warrior and every now and then shouted to the soldiers: “Beat them guys, beat them! Ten people of children, guys, hit! At one of the mosques, he stumbled upon an armed Sart, did not get lost, kissed and killed him on the spot. - “Beat them, dogs, guys! ten children!...” the venerable father of the family spoke with great conviction, loading his gun again.

Two small incidents happened to Vereshchagin, which, however, ended happily. Looking around one of the side courtyards, he saw a sart armed with batik, on which,

One soldier, probably not distinguished by great courage, lagged behind the others and walked at a considerable distance behind, four Sarts, hiding in one of the sackels and unnoticed by the people in front, jumped out of their ambush and attacked the lagging one. Three of them were armed with batiks, the fourth, it seems, had a cartoon. The soldier's gun was unloaded. He apparently did not expect the attack and was completely at a loss. - "Brothers, help!" he shouted to his comrades ahead. Five people who heard the scream rushed to help. But while they ran to the scene, one of the Sarts (the other three, seeing the approach of the Russians, fled) managed to hit the bewildered soldier with batik on the head and was about to repeat the blow. Wounded by one of the running up soldiers with a bullet in the arm, he lowered the batik, did not budge, and surrendered without resistance to the fate that awaited him .......

Religious fanaticism sometimes leads Asians to extremely bold, even reckless antics. On the fourth day, on a sortie, some of the people were left by Nazarov at the crossroads to cover the other half, moving further from the bazaar, since there were always large crowds at the latter. The people left in this place busied themselves with lighting the sakels and watching

The sortie on the 4th was especially useful in regard to the moral significance it had on the garrison. This was not a nightly movement in secret, but a bold and successful offensive during the day, which gave the garrison the right not to consider itself completely enclosed in the citadel.

The commandant, as it turned out, did not know about Nazarov's movement into the city. He was very alarmed by this and even sent a team to ensure a sortie of free retreat to the citadel. This measure, however, turned out to be unnecessary, since the enemy, puzzled by the bold movement of Nazarov, did not dare to attack his people.

The night from the 2nd to the 3rd, as already noted, we did not close our eyes, and therefore everyone was extremely tired. In the following nights, in order not to exhaust the people, it was decided to divide them into shifts so that one would stay awake and support the skirmish, and the rest would rest. At the same time, of course, sleeping was located at the very gate behind the bags and along the edges of the site. But since any accident has a stronger effect on a person who has just woken up than on a waking person, Colonel Nazarov ordered to bring his bed, ordered to put it near the gun itself and went to bed. Such an act had a double meaning: firstly, in case of alarm, Nazarov was where his presence was considered absolutely necessary; secondly, the soldiers, seeing the “colonel” next to them, fell asleep quite calmly, in full confidence that nothing special would happen to them. In such a mood, no nighttime alarm could stun the soldier. - “Look, guys,” Nazarov told the soldiers, sitting on the bed, “do not dare to make noise, I want to sleep; and these scoundrels (he nodded his head towards the city) should not be allowed to interfere with my rest.

In general, Nazarov knew how to talk with soldiers; they were always pleased and often laughed heartily after some of his jokes. With his cheerful character, and more, of course, courage in critical moments, Nazarov gained great respect for himself not only from soldiers, but also from officers. With the latter, he was on the shortest leg, he said “you” to many and did not hesitate to scold,

Despite the departure of Shahrisyab residents, the enemy continued to besiege the city with great energy. Attempts to break into the citadel were repeated several times a day. The last of them, made on June 7, on the eve of the return of the commander of the troops to Samarkand, was the most desperate. Having gathered for saklys against the Bukhara Gates, the enemy began to read prayers that were heard to us from word to word. Having finished them, op rushed to the gate. Buckshot and hand grenades stopped the attackers. His arrows lay down along the ditch fifteen paces from our obstruction with a gun and fired at the gates; the rest crowded behind the left tower until they were finally dispersed by grenades. Fireworks was in charge of this business. One of the sapper soldiers, Ivanov, I remember, offered his help to the artilleryman. - "Give it, he says, I'll throw it." - “If you please, drop it,” the artilleryman answered him, “only you look ... - “What to watch? let the sarts watch, and I'll quit," Ivanov quipped and took the grenade in his hands. The fireworks lit the pipe. Everything was in order so far. Ivanov swung to throw a grenade over the wall, but, unexpectedly for all those present, he was confused and dropped it on the floor in a circle of ten comrades. We barely had time to jump out of the tower, otherwise it would have been bad.

The Samarkand citadel presented a terrible, amazing picture to the detachment returning from Kata-Kurgan. Smoky piles of collapsed sakels that we set on fire on sorties; burnt, mutilated corpses scattered among the ruins and emitting an unbearable stench that polluted the air; the emaciated and smoky faces of the defenders, who kept on their feet only due to moral stress - that's what the detachment imagined on June 8th. Fresh traces of the struggle were eloquent proof of her tenacity. The garrison was happy, realizing that the share entrusted to it was fulfilled honestly.