Landing with the engines off. Landing of airliners with a failed power plant - Airfield - LiveJournal
Gimli Glider is the unofficial name of one of the Boeing 767 aircraft. airlines Air Canada received by him after an unusual aviation accident on July 23, 1983. This aircraft operated flight AC143 from Montreal to Edmonton (with an intermediate stop in Ottawa). During the flight, he suddenly ran out of fuel and the engines stopped. After lengthy planning, the aircraft successfully landed at the closed Gimli military base. All 69 people on board - 61 passengers and 8 crew members - survived.
AIRPLANE
Boeing 767-233 (registration number C-GAUN, factory 22520, serial 047) was released in 1983 (the first flight was made on March 10). March 30 of the same year was transferred to Air Canada. Powered by two Pratt & Whitney JT9D-7R4D engines.
CREW
The aircraft commander is Robert "Bob" Pearson. Robert "Bob" Pearson. Has flown over 15,000 hours.
The co-pilot is Maurice Quintal. Has flown over 7000 hours.
Six flight attendants worked in the cabin of the aircraft.
ENGINE FAILURE
At an altitude of 12,000 meters, a signal suddenly sounded, warning of low pressure in the fuel system of the left engine. The on-board computer showed that there was more than enough fuel, but its readings, as it turned out, were based on erroneous information entered into it. Both pilots decided that the fuel pump was faulty and turned it off. Since the tanks are located above the engines, under the influence of gravity, the fuel had to flow into the engines without pumps, by gravity. But a few minutes later, a similar signal from the right engine sounded, and the pilots decided to change course to Winnipeg (the nearest suitable airport). A few seconds later, the port engine cut out and they began to prepare for landing on one engine.
While the pilots were trying to start the left engine and were negotiating with Winnipeg, the engine failure acoustic signal sounded again, accompanied by another additional horn - a long thumping "boom-mm" sound. Both pilots heard this sound for the first time, since it had not been heard before during their work on simulators. It was a signal "failure of all engines" (for this type of aircraft - two). The aircraft was left without power, and most of the instrument panels on the panel went out. By this time, the plane had already descended to 8500 meters, heading towards Winnipeg.
Like most aircraft, the Boeing 767 gets its electricity from generators driven by engines. The shutdown of both engines led to a complete blackout of the aircraft's electrical system; the pilots were left with only backup devices, autonomously powered from the on-board battery, including the radio station. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the pilots found themselves without a very important device - a variometer that measures vertical speed. In addition, the pressure in the hydraulic system dropped, since the hydraulic pumps were also driven by engines.
However, the design of the aircraft was designed for the failure of both engines. The emergency turbine, driven by the oncoming air flow, started automatically. Theoretically, the electricity generated by it should be enough for the plane to maintain controllability during landing.
The PIC got used to flying the "glider", and the co-pilot immediately began to look in the emergency instructions for a section on piloting an aircraft without engines, but there was no such section. Fortunately, the PIC flew gliders, as a result of which he mastered some piloting techniques that commercial airline pilots do not usually use. He knew that in order to reduce the rate of descent, the optimal gliding rate must be maintained. He maintained a speed of 220 knots (407 km / h), suggesting that the optimal glide speed should be about this. The co-pilot began to calculate whether they would reach Winnipeg. He used the backup mechanical altimeter readings to determine the altitude, and the distance traveled was reported to him by the controller from Winnipeg, determining it by the movement of the aircraft mark on the radar. The liner lost 5,000 feet (1.5 km) of altitude, flying 10 nautical miles (18.5 km), that is, the aerodynamic quality of the glider was approximately 12. The controller and the co-pilot came to the conclusion that flight AC143 would not reach Winnipeg.
Then, as a landing site, the co-pilot chose the Gimli air base, where he had previously served. He did not know that the base was closed by that time, and the runway number 32L, on which they decided to land, was converted into a car racing track, and a powerful dividing barrier was placed in the middle of it. On this day, a "family holiday" of the local car club was held there, races were held on the former runway and there were many people. In the beginning twilight, the runway was illuminated by lights.
The air turbine did not provide enough pressure in the hydraulic system for a regular landing gear extension, so the pilots tried to extend the landing gear in an emergency. The main landing gear came out normally, but the nose gear came out, but did not lock.
Shortly before landing, the commander realized that the plane was flying too high and too fast. He dropped the aircraft's speed to 180 knots, and to lose altitude he undertook a maneuver atypical for commercial airliners - sliding onto the wing (the pilot presses the left pedal and turns the steering wheel to the right or vice versa, while the aircraft quickly loses speed and altitude). However, this maneuver reduced the speed of rotation of the emergency turbine, and the pressure in the hydraulic control system dropped even more. Pearson was able to withdraw the aircraft from the maneuver almost at the last moment.
The plane descended onto the runway, the riders and spectators began to scatter from it. When the landing gear wheels touched the runway, the commander applied the brakes. The tires instantly overheated, the emergency valves bled the air out of them, the unsecured nose landing gear folded, the nose touched the concrete, carving a trail of sparks, the starboard engine nacelle caught on the ground. People managed to leave the strip, and the commander did not have to roll out the plane from it, saving people on the ground. The plane came to a stop less than 30 meters from the audience.
A small fire started in the nose of the aircraft, and the command was given to begin the evacuation of passengers. Due to the fact that the tail was raised, the slope of the inflatable ladder in the rear emergency exit was too large, several people received minor injuries, but no one was seriously injured. The fire was soon extinguished by motorists with dozens of hand-held fire extinguishers.
Two days later, the plane was repaired on the spot and was able to fly from Gimli. After an additional repair costing about $ 1 million, the aircraft was returned to service. On January 24, 2008, the aircraft was sent to a storage base in the Mojave Desert.
CIRCUMSTANCES
Information about the amount of fuel in the Boeing 767 tanks is calculated by the Fuel Quantity Indicator System (FQIS) and displayed on indicators in the cockpit. FQIS on this aircraft consisted of two channels that calculated the amount of fuel independently and compared the results. It was allowed to operate the aircraft with only one serviceable channel in the event of a failure of one of them, however, in this case, the displayed number had to be checked by a float indicator before departure. In the event of a failure of both channels, the amount of fuel in the cab would not be displayed; the aircraft should have been declared defective and not allowed to fly.
Following the discovery of FQIS malfunctions on other 767 aircraft, Boeing Corporation issued a service announcement on the routine FQIS inspection procedure. An engineer in Edmonton performed this procedure after the arrival of C-GAUN from Toronto the day before the accident. During this test, the FQIS completely failed and the cockpit fuel gauges stopped working. Earlier in the month, the engineer encountered the same problem on the same plane. Then he discovered that turning off the second channel with the circuit breaker restores the fuel quantity indicators, although now their readings are based on data from only one channel. Due to the lack of spare parts, the engineer simply reproduced the temporary solution he had found earlier: he pressed and marked the circuit breaker switch with a special label, turning off the second channel.
On the day of the incident, the plane was flying from Edmonton to Montreal with an intermediate stop in Ottawa. Before take-off, the engineer informed the crew commander of the problem and indicated that the amount of fuel indicated by the FQIS system should be checked with a float indicator. The pilot misunderstood the engineer and believed that the plane had already flown yesterday from Toronto with this defect. The flight went well, the fuel gauges worked on the data of one channel.
In Montreal, the crews changed, Pearson and Quintal were supposed to fly back to Edmonton via Ottawa. The replacement pilot informed them of the problem with FQIS, passing on to them his delusion that the plane was flying with this problem yesterday as well. In addition, FQ Pearson also misunderstood his predecessor: he believed that he was told that FQIS had not worked at all since that time.
In preparation for the flight to Edmonton, the technician decided to investigate a problem with the FQIS. To test the system, he turned on the second FQIS channel - the indicators in the cockpit stopped working. At that moment, he was called to measure the amount of fuel in the tanks with a float indicator. Being distracted, he forgot to turn off the second channel, but he did not remove the label from the switch. The switch remained marked, and it was now imperceptible that the circuit was closed. From that moment on, FQIS did not work at all, and the indicators in the cockpit did not show anything.
The aircraft maintenance log kept a record of all actions. There was also the entry "SERVICE CHK - FOUND FUEL QTY IND BLANK - FUEL QTY #2 C/B PULLED & TAGGED..." Of course, this reflected a malfunction (the indicators stopped showing the amount of fuel) and the action taken (turning off the second FQIS channel), but it was not clearly indicated that the action corrected the malfunction.
Upon entering the cockpit, PIC Pearson saw exactly what he expected: inoperative fuel gauges and a tagged switch. He consulted the Minimum Equipment List (MEL) and found out that the aircraft was not fit to fly in this condition. However, at that time, the Boeing 767, which made its first flight only in September 1981, was a very new aircraft. The C-GAUN was the 47th Boeing 767 produced; Air Canada received it less than 4 months ago. During this time, 55 corrections had already been made to the list of minimum required equipment, and some pages were still empty, because the corresponding procedures had not yet been developed. Due to the unreliability of the list information, a procedure for approving each flight of the Boeing 767 was introduced into practice. technical staff. In addition to misconceptions about the condition of the aircraft on previous flights, exacerbated by what Pearson saw in the cockpit with his own eyes, he had a signed maintenance log clearing the flight - and in practice, the approval of the technicians took precedence over the requirements of the list.
The incident happened at a time when Canada was switching to the metric system. As part of this transition, all Boeing 767s received by Air Canada were the first aircraft to use the metric system and operate in liters and kilograms rather than gallons and pounds. All other aircraft used the same system of weights and measures. According to the pilot's calculations, the flight to Edmonton required 22,300 kg of fuel. A measurement with a float indicator showed that there were 7682 liters of fuel in the aircraft's tanks. To determine the amount of fuel to refuel, it was necessary to convert the volume of fuel into mass, subtract the result from 22,300, and convert the answer back to liters. According to Air Canada's instructions for other types of aircraft, this action was supposed to be performed by a flight engineer, but there was no one on the Boeing 767 crew: the representative aircraft of the new generation was controlled by only two pilots. Air Canada's job descriptions have not delegated responsibility for this task to anyone.
A liter of aviation kerosene weighs 0.803 kilograms, that is, the correct calculation looks like this:
7682 l × 0.803 kg/l = 6169 kg
22 300 kg - 6169 kg = 16 131 kg
16,131 kg ÷ 0.803 kg/l = 20,089 l
However, neither the crew of Flight 143 nor the ground crew knew this. As a result of the discussion, it was decided to use a factor of 1.77 - the mass of a liter of fuel in pounds. It was this coefficient that was recorded in the tanker's handbook and was always used on all other aircraft. So the calculations were:
7682 l × 1.77 "kg" / l \u003d 13,597 "kg"
22,300 kg - 13,597 "kg" = 8703 kg
8703 kg ÷ 1.77 "kg" / l = 4916 l
Instead of the required 20,089 liters (which would correspond to 16,131 kilograms) of fuel, 4916 liters (3948 kg) entered the tanks, that is, more than four times less than necessary. Taking into account the fuel on board, its amount was enough for 40-45% of the journey. Since FQIS was not working, the commander checked the calculation, but used the same factor and, of course, got the same result.
The flight control computer (FCC) measures fuel consumption, allowing the crew to keep track of the amount of fuel burned in flight. Under normal circumstances, the PMC receives data from the FQIS, but in the event of a failure of the FQIS, the initial value can be entered manually. The PIC was sure that there were 22,300 kg of fuel on board, and entered exactly this number.
Since the FMC was reset during the stop in Ottawa, the PIC again measured the amount of fuel in the tanks with a float indicator. When converting liters to kilograms, the wrong factor was again used. The crew believed that there were 20,400 kg of fuel in the tanks, while in fact the fuel was still less than half the required amount.
wikipedia
Landing with idle engines in itself is more than a difficult situation in flight. For example, pilots on twin-engine aircraft in military aviation practice a flight only with an imitation of a single engine failure (IOD), this is when one engine is put on the MG mode and a flight is performed to pilot the aircraft, then the landing approach and the landing itself with the IOD. As it turned out later in practice, flying with an IOD and flying with the engine turned off are TWO VERY BIG DIFFERENCES. Despite the fact that the engines are installed almost near the axis of the aircraft, the resulting turning moments are large enough and unexpected.
But landing without an engine (more precisely, its imitation) was practiced only if it was provided for by the Instruction to the pilot, while the exercise was performed on a pre-selected site with the required dimensions or when landing at your own airfield, when each bush was different, so to speak. As a rule, on training aircraft and with an instructor.
Therefore, cases of landing without engines on civil aircraft are a rather unique phenomenon:
1. It's easier to sit in the fog.
2. No skill.
3. Responsibility - the life of passengers
4. Your life after the third point
etc.
The number of such landings depends on the chosen time of aviation, on piston aircraft - this was a very common phenomenon, such engines and aircraft were such - some provided, others allowed to land wherever they could.
In jet aviation, forced landings began to end in disaster more often, it became a phenomenon when, when testing the first supersonic jet aircraft, test pilots tried to save the aircraft and save the cause of the failure by performing a forced landing.
Although, as they say, who is heaven, who is hell. The cadets managed to regularly land without an engine - apparently the saying that fools are lucky here manifested itself in full.
So, let's begin.
Raspiarenny to bliss - we are already familiar. If - read.
From Soviet well-known cases -
Less known, but more modern story about the Tu-204.
January 14, 2002 Tu-204 landed in Omsk with idle engines. The plane rolled out of the runway by more than 400 meters during landing. None of the passengers were hurt. It seems so trite...
On January 14, 2002, a serious aviation incident with the aircraft Tu-204 RA-64011 of Siberia Airlines.
The crew operated flight 852 on the route Frankfurt am Main - Tolmachevo. There were 117 passengers and 22 crew members on board. According to the MSRP, the aircraft had 28,197 kg of fuel before takeoff. Barnaul was chosen as an alternate airfield. The flight along the route was carried out at flight level 10100 meters. Before descending for landing approach at Tolmachevo Airport, according to the MSRP, there were 5443 kg of fuel on board the aircraft. At the Barnaul alternate aerodrome, the weather conditions did not correspond to the minimum weather, in connection with which the crew chose the Omsk alternate aerodrome (according to the crew's calculation, the amount of fuel to go to it should be 4800 kg).
In connection with the expectation of improved weather conditions at the Tolmachevo airfield, the crew flew according to the pattern at an altitude of 1500 meters for about 10 minutes, after which they proceeded to the landing approach. During the landing approach, the crew received information that the lateral component of the wind exceeded the limits set by the Tu-204 aircraft flight manual and decided to proceed to the Omsk alternate aerodrome with the flight control if, according to the crew, there were 4800 kg of fuel on board the aircraft (according to the MSRP- 4064 kg). The weather forecast for the route Novosibirsk-Omsk provided for a headwind of 120-140 km/h. During the climb, an alarm was activated about the reserve fuel balance of 2600 kg, according to the crew's explanations, the balance was 3600 kg (according to the MSRP - 3157 kg). The commission of inquiry found that the crew allowed the possibility of landing with idle engines, in connection with which the descent from the flight level of 9600 meters began at a distance of 150 km (direct approach). At an altitude of about 1600 m and a distance of 17-14 km from the airfield, there was a sequential shutdown of the engines. After the emergency release of mechanization and landing gear, the crew landed on the runway with a flight of 1480 meters. On the run, emergency braking was applied. The aircraft rolled out of the runway at a speed of about 150 km/h, destroying 14 lights while moving along the control room and stopped at a distance of 452 meters from the end of the runway. Passengers and crew were not injured, the tires of the wheels have minor damage. The investigation into this event is ongoing. It should be noted that the weather forecasts for Novosibirsk (in terms of visibility) and Omsk (in terms of wind and visibility) did not come true.
Even less known is the accident of the Yak-40 of the Ukrainian UGA near Armavir on December 7, 1976.
At 18:14 Moscow time when approaching the airport Mineralnye Vody the crew received an instruction from the dispatcher to leave for an alternate airfield due to difficult weather conditions in the area of the Minvod airport (fog, visibility less than 300 m). The crew requested a landing at Stavropol airport. The dispatcher did not give permission for it, saying that there was fog in Stavropol with a visibility of 300 m. The aircraft was sent to the Krasnodar airport with a small amount of fuel left. Since there was not enough fuel to Krasnodar, according to the crew's calculations, it was decided to make an emergency landing at a military airfield in Armavir. On the pre-landing straight due to running out of fuel, the engines stopped. The crew managed to make an emergency landing in a field 2 km from the runway. The plane stopped among small trees. None of the passengers and crew members on board were injured. The aircraft was damaged and was written off.
During the investigation, it was found that at the time when the crew was denied landing in Stavropol, visibility in the area of his airport was not below the minimum and amounted to 700 m, which made it possible to land.
Well, military aviation happens in different ways - for example, the landing of a Su-7u twin after the engine stops after the passage of the DPRM, that is, at an altitude of about 200m due to a failure of the fuel pumps. Su-7u without an engine is aerodynamically equal to a brick. But here the experience of the instructor worked - they sat right in front of them, they didn’t choose the field anymore - they were 1001% lucky /
1981 Millerovo airfield. 
And then the good old An-12 showed its advantage, but even in an open field, everything can be done if the commander shows how. 
Although it happens...
The crash of An-8 ICHP Avia (Novosibirsk) near the airport Chita October 30, 1992 RA-69346
The aircraft belonged to NAPO them. Chkalov, was leased to IChP Avia (Novosibirsk) and operated a commercial flight on the route Yelizovo - Okha - Mogocha - Chita - Novosibirsk. There were 9 passengers on board, two of them were service passengers, all citizens of Russia. Cargo amounted to 3 passenger car Toyota and fish products in cardboard boxes. The declared weight of the cargo is 4,260 kg. When landing at night in simple weather conditions, on the pre-landing line, at a distance of 6 km from the runway threshold, the aircraft mark on the control locator screen disappeared and radio communication with the crew ceased. The aircraft was found at a distance of 1,600 meters from the runway threshold of the Chita airfield. The crew and 8 passengers were killed, one passenger was seriously injured and subsequently died. The aircraft was completely destroyed from the cockpit to the cargo compartment. The commission found that the landing approach was carried out with a small amount of fuel left with a landing weight exceeding the allowable one by about 5 tons. Due to running out of fuel, the right engine stopped before the fourth turn, and the left engine stopped on the pre-landing straight. The aircraft went into a descent and, at a distance of 1,657 m from the runway, collided with the ground, and then, after running 15 m, with sand dumps. The crash occurred at 04:47 local time (22:47 Moscow time on October 29).
Flying is a test for many people, and passengers are always worried that something might go wrong a few thousand meters above the ground. So what actually happens when an engine fails mid-flight? Is it time to panic?
The reasons for engine failure in flight can be a lack of fuel, as well as ingestion of birds and volcanic ash.
Are we going to fall?!
While it may look like the plane will crash if the engine stops working, thankfully, that's not the case at all.
It is not uncommon for pilots to idle an aircraft. The two pilots, who wished to remain anonymous, told the truth to Express.co.uk. "If one engine fails mid-flight, this is not too much of a problem, as modern aircraft they can fly on one engine," one of the pilots told the publication.
Modern aircraft are designed to glide over fairly long distances without the use of engines. Given the large number of airports in the world, the ship will most likely reach the landing site and be able to land.
If the plane flies with one engine - this is not a reason to panic.
What to do if one engine fails - step by step instructions
The pilot of another airline explained step by step what measures they take when an engine fails. It is necessary to set a certain speed and get the maximum performance from the second running engine.
Should you tell the passengers?
Sitting in the cabin, you may not realize that the engine is out of order. Whether the captain informs the passengers of what has happened "very much depends on the specific situation, as well as on the policy of the airline." It's the captain's decision.
If an engine failure is an obvious fact to the passengers, then the captain should explain the situation to them truthfully. But to avoid panic, if no one notices anything, you can keep silent.
Lucky landings
In 1982, a British Airways flight to Jakarta, Indonesia, was struck by volcanic ash at 11,000 meters and all four engines failed. The pilot managed to hold the plane for 23 minutes, flew 91 miles in this way and slowly descended from an altitude of 11 km to 3600 m. During this time, the team managed to restart all engines and land safely. And this is not the only happy occasion.
In 2001, while flying over Atlantic Ocean an Air Transat aircraft with 293 passengers and 13 crew on board lost both engines. The ship planned for 19 minutes and flew about 120 kilometers before making a hard landing at Lajes airport (Pico Island). Everyone survived, and the liner received a "gold medal" as the aircraft that covered the longest distance at idle.
Maybe! There were cases, moreover, quite often. And not only in the Air Force, but also in civil aviation.
I’m too lazy to look, but right now I can only remember: in 2004, Tushka (TU-154) crashed at the Chelyabinsk airport, with three engines turned off, I don’t remember the details already, if you want, you can search somewhere in news blogs, I remember exactly the case It was winter in December or January.
And from what I know, here it is: Instructions for MiG-17 - "VIII. SPECIAL CASES IN FLIGHT"
ACTIONS OF THE PILOT WHEN THE ENGINE IS SELF-SHUT-OFF IN FLIGHT
Pay attention to the point -371
370 . In case of self-shutdown of the engine during flight in simple meteorological conditions, it is necessary:
Close stop valve immediately;
Move the engine control lever back to the ground idle stop;
Report by radio to the checkpoint about the engine stop, flight altitude and place;
Turn off all circuit breakers, except for the circuit breakers of the radio station and the aircraft identification radio transponder (SRO), as well as instruments and assemblies that ensure the engine start and operation in flight, and trimmers of the elevator and ailerons.
371 . If the engine switches off at an altitude of less than 2000 m, do not try to start it; depending on the situation, the pilot must:
When staying close to the airfield, to which the flight altitude allows planning, to land with the landing gear extended;
When flying over flat terrain (meadow, arable land), make an emergency landing with the landing gear retracted;
When flying over terrain unsuitable for an emergency landing with the landing gear retracted, leave the aircraft by ejection.
372 . In case of self-switching off of the engine at an altitude of more than 2000 m, start the engine. If it was not possible to start the engine up to an altitude of 2000 m, then the pilot must act as indicated above.
373 . When the engine stops at an altitude of more than 11,000 m, descend at the maximum possible vertical speed to an altitude of 11,000-10,000 m, while monitoring the flight speed.
374 . In case of self-shutdown of the engine during flight in difficult meteorological conditions, the pilot is obliged at an altitude of more than 2000 m:
Close stop valve;
Put the aircraft into descent mode;
Turn off all electrical consumers, except for the attitude indicator, DGMK compass, radio station and aircraft identification radio transponder (SRO), as well as instruments and assemblies that ensure the start and operation of the engine in flight, and trimmers of the elevator and ailerons;
Report an engine stop at the checkpoint;
Descent to the exit from the clouds should be carried out only in a straight line;
When leaving the clouds above 2000 m, start the engine.
375 . If the pilot, when descending in the clouds with the engine stopped to an altitude of 2000 m, did not exit the clouds, or if, after leaving the clouds, the aircraft is over terrain that does not ensure the survival of the pilot during a forced landing, he is obliged to leave the aircraft by ejection.
376 . In all cases of engine stop when flying in clouds at an altitude of less than 2000 m, the pilot must leave the aircraft by ejection.
377 . In cases of engine stop when flying at night at altitudes of more than 2000 m, the pilot starts the engine. If the engine does not start up to an altitude of 2000 m and the possibility of landing on an illuminated runway at his airfield is excluded, the pilot must leave the aircraft by ejection.
Decided to put it in one post. The topic is scary, but it may be interesting for someone to read in one post. For possible jambs, I ask you not to hit hard, I will try to fix it immediately.
Human fear of flying is irrational. But often it is reinforced by poor awareness of the achievements of modern aviation.
For example engine failures. It seems to be well known that a modern aircraft is able to continue flying if one of the engines fails. But what is much less known is that the failure of ALL engines in flight does not necessarily lead to disaster. In the minds of many modern liner- this is such an iron that is able to fly only using the thrust of the engines.
However, it is not. Liners have a fairly high aerodynamic quality - for example, for the Tu-204 it reaches 18. In fact, this means that the loss of a kilometer of altitude in a non-motorized flight, the aircraft is able to fly 18 km. If we take into account that the typical altitude for mainline flights is 9-10 km (and for the Tu-154 in some conditions it can reach up to 12 km), we get that the crew has 150-180 kilometers of range to the nearest airport. This is quite a lot - after all, they try to lay air routes over airports (http://aviaforum.ru/showpost.php?p=231385&postcount=3 - here you can take the track of the real flight Ulan-Ude - Moscow). The issue of power supply to the most important systems of the aircraft when the engines are not running is solved by the emergency turbine advanced into the stream.
Naturally, the landing of an aircraft with a completely failed power plant requires great skill and luck from the crew. The margin in height and range for planning on the airport runway is not enough - the pilots need to very accurately land at a jewelry-calculated height. At the same time, they do not have the right to make a mistake - during a flight or short distance, the plane will be outside the runway - and far from everywhere this is an open field - at many airports there are buildings or even residential buildings behind / in front of the runway. In a normal situation, the liner will simply go to the second circle - in an emergency there is no such chance. At the same time, the landing can also take place in bad weather conditions with insufficient visibility - left without thrust, the liner is forced to land where it can plan - regardless of the weather and the crew's permission. In this case, it is often not possible to release the landing gear and the aircraft has to be landed on the fuselage. If the chassis managed to be released, then when braking, it remains only to rely on the brakes - and their capabilities in this situation are usually insufficient ...
Despite the reliability of technology, cases of failure of all engines are still not isolated. This happens for a number of reasons, often due to personnel errors when servicing the liner. Accordingly, cases of successful landings in such situations are also known.
The civil aviation of the USSR / RF did not pass such incidents. From recent:
- Landing in January 2002 Tu-204 AK Siberia with idle engines. The reason is the complete depletion of fuel.
landing at Sheremetyevo Falcon. The reason is a malfunction in the fuel system
But the most fantastic story happened in 1963. The Tu-124 of the Tallinn-Moscow flight did not remove the nose landing gear. It was decided to land at Pulkovo. Due to the second malfunction - a malfunction of the fuel gauges, one of the engines stopped on one of the laps. The controllers gave permission for the emergency aircraft to pass over the city - and at an altitude of 450 m above Leningrad, the second engine stopped. Nevertheless, in such an extreme situation, the crew masterfully flew the liner over the bridges and landed on the Neva - no one was hurt. IMHO - this landing is much more difficult than the Chkalovsky spans under bridges.
Under the cut - a photo of the Gimli Glider after landing. According to the text of the link to the articles - there are more details about aircraft and incidents.
