Airbus a310 took off from. A310 plane crash near Mezhdurechensk
» (computer reconstruction)
Fall from the train
Strangers in the cockpit, unexplored features of aircraft instruments
Fragments of the A310 fuselage - a fragment of the inscription "AEROFLOT"
Flight SU593 crash took place on March 22, 1994 near Mezhdurechensk in the Kemerovo region. As a result of the fall of the Aeroflot A310 aircraft, all 75 people on board were killed.
The main cause of the disaster was an unacceptable situation in which the aircraft commander put his fifteen-year-old son at the helm of the airliner, whose unintentional actions led to a partial shutdown of the autopilot. Secondary reasons were the undocumented behavior of the autopilot, and the absence, at that time, of the rules for making decisions in such situations in the crew training program.
Crew
Flight
Flight 593 was operated by an Airbus A310-304 (F-OGQS "M. Glinka") from Moscow Sheremetyevo Airport (SVO) to Kaitak Airport, Hong Kong (HKG). Crew commander Yaroslav Kudrinsky took on board his two children - daughter Yana and son Eldar. When the plane was flying in the Novokuznetsk region, Kudrinsky, in violation of the charter, allowed first his daughter, and then his son, to sit in the ship's commander's chair. This circumstance was ignored by other crew members.
Catastrophe
Before allowing the children to take the command chair, Kudrinsky turned on the autopilot. The daughter of the commander did not try to take any action to control the aircraft. After her, the captain's son, 15-year-old Eldar Kudrinsky, sat at the helm. The teenager held on to the steering wheel, rocking it slightly from side to side, which could not lead to the autopilot being turned off by “overpowering”. However, in the end, Eldar applied a force of 8-10 kg to the helm for 30 seconds, which led to a partial shutdown of the autopilot, which stopped giving commands to the ailerons, which, in turn, caused an uncontrollable roll to the right side. Before this feature the autopilot of the A310 was unknown to the crew. The light alarm for disabling the mode worked, but the crew did not notice this, since design feature A310 is the absence of an audible alarm disabling the autopilot.
Eldar was the first to notice the roll of the plane and informed his father about it. However, both professional pilots for several seconds could not understand the reason for the abnormal behavior of the aircraft. As the track line on the screen changed to a circle, the co-pilot assumed that the aircraft had entered the "holding zone", that is, it was describing large diameter circles - a flight pattern used while waiting for landing clearance.
The aircraft banked to the right at a rate of about 1.5° per second, and soon the right bank reached 45°, which was above the acceptable limit. This caused significant positive g-forces (4.8 g). When the crew noticed that the autopilot had been disabled, they tried to retake their seats.
Contrary to instructions, the co-pilot, in the absence of the commander in his seat, pushed his seat all the way back, which for a long time did not allow him to take up a working position due to the resulting overloads. The commander of the aircraft, due to strong overloads and a large bank angle, could not get into his seat for a long time.
The situation was greatly complicated by the fact that in the left seat there was still the only person who had the physical ability to fly the aircraft - the 15-year-old son of the commander, who received and tried to carry out various, inconsistent and conflicting commands from his father, co-pilot and a third adult friend who was in the cockpit the families of the crew commander, also a pilot, who flew on the same flight and came to the cockpit with the children. According to the analysis of the "black box" soundtrack, Eldar's attempts to correct the situation were greatly hampered by ignorance of the pilot's jargon. As an example, the command “Hold the helm!” Was cited, which the boy mistook for a command to hold the helm in the extreme right position, while the pilots meant the command to level the aircraft.
Meanwhile, the bank had already reached 90 °, and the plane began to lose altitude. In order to prevent further descent, the autopilot (only the automatic roll was turned off) increased the pitch angle to such an extent that the aircraft began to quickly lose speed and went into a stall. The co-pilot completely turned off the automatic and managed to bring the plane out of the stall by lowering the nose. The overload decreased, and the commander finally managed to pull his son out of his chair and take a job. The pilots brought the plane into normal flight mode, but could not recognize their spatial position in time. Flying over a hill at low altitude, the plane caught on the edges of trees and crashed into a forest near the village of Maly Mayzas, about 20 kilometers southeast of Mezhdurechensk.
Consequences of the plane crash
In the course of an investigation conducted jointly by Aeroflot and Airbus, changes were made to the documentation of the aircraft and Aeroflot's pilot training plan. In particular, now in the flight manual on the website airdisaster.ru
plane crashA310 near Mezhdurechensk - the accident that occurred on the night of March 22-23, 1994 with an Airbus A310-308 airliner of Aeroflot. Because of a child who accidentally turned off the autopilot and took control, the plane went into a tailspin and crashed near Mezhdurechensk. All 75 people on board were killed.
Events
March 22, 1994 at 20:39 local time Airbus airliner Aeroflot A310 took off from the runway of Moscow's Sheremetyevo Airport and headed for Hong Kong. 63 passengers taken on board could not worry about anything: the A310 with the assigned name of M. Glinka was one of the first new European aircraft delivered to the Aeroflot fleet just a couple of years ago, the aircraft was flown by experienced pilots, and 9 flight attendants worked in the cabin.
The flight went well and, 3.5 hours after takeoff, the crew commander called his two children into the cockpit: daughter Yana and son Eldar. When the plane was flying in the Novokuznetsk area, he allowed first his daughter and then his son to sit in the chair of the ship's commander. In addition, a family friend, also an Aeroflot pilot, was in the cockpit, flying on the same flight as a passenger.
Before allowing the children to take the command seat, the commander turned on the autopilot. First, the commander's daughter, 13-year-old Yana Kudrinskaya, sat at the helm. She did not attempt to take any action to control the aircraft. After her, the captain's son, 15-year-old Eldar, sat at the helm. The teenager held on to the steering wheel, rocking it slightly from side to side. This did not bother the crew, as the aircraft was under the control of the autopilot. However, in the end, Eldar applied a force of 8-10 kg to the steering wheel for 30 seconds, which led to a partial shutdown of the autopilot, which stopped giving commands to the ailerons - the crew did not know about this feature of the autopilot. Also, the pilots did not notice the light indication, but there was no sound signal.
Eldar was the first to notice the roll of the plane and reported it. However, both professional pilots for several seconds could not understand the reason for the abnormal behavior of the aircraft.
The aircraft banked to the right at a rate of about 1.5° per second, and soon the right roll reached 45°, which was above the acceptable limit. When the crew noticed that the autopilot had been disabled, they tried to retake their seats.
The co-pilot, having relaxed, pushed his seat back strongly and, at a critical moment, due to overloads, could not return to his seat. The commander also, due to overloads, could not sit in his chair. As a result, in conditions of severe loss of height with a roll, the only person who controlled the aircraft was a 15-year-old boy. He was further confused by the fact that he heard many commands from three people, while often not understanding the pilot's jargon.
Meanwhile, the bank had already reached 90 °, and the plane began to lose altitude. In order to prevent further descent, the autopilot increased the pitch angle to such an extent that the aircraft began to rapidly lose speed and went into a stall. The co-pilot completely turned off the automatic and managed to bring the plane out of the stall by lowering the nose. The overload decreased, and the commander finally managed to pull his son out of his chair and take a job. The pilots brought the plane into normal flight mode, but could not recognize their spatial position in time.
An Airbus A310 airliner with 75 people on board hit the edges of trees and crashed into a forest near Mezhdurechensk. No one survived.
Air crash investigation
Search and rescue operations at the crash site were carried out for quite a long time: the remains of passengers and the wreckage of the aircraft were scattered within a radius of 2 km. Later, the found parts of the aircraft were transported to the hangar of the aviation enterprise of the Novokuznetsk airport, where they were attached to the frame according to the shape of the aircraft. In the same place, representatives of Aeroflot and Airbus took up the study of the circumstances of the disaster.
The first versions of the causes of the disaster seemed exotic: the plane either collided with a natural celestial body, or became a victim of a UFO. These assumptions were based on the fact that the airliner was flying at an altitude of 10,100 meters, clearly withstood all the specified flight parameters, the crew did not give any emergency signals, there was no information about the failure of any instruments, and an experienced crew flew the aircraft. Later, there were rumors about an alleged terrorist attack and depressurization of the aircraft, which caused the instant death of the crew and passengers.
Chairman of the Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) Vladimir Kofman admitted several years later: “ The case is unprecedented. At that time, as they say, we did not have the conscience or the courage to say that the plane was killed by a child. But the recording on the voice recorder and further investigation, which lasted a whole year, showed that other options were excluded. After this incident, the journalists spoke in unison about the "pilot's fault", the "human factor" in matters of accidents and so on. And we thought about something else - about the role of the co-pilot. After all, children were put at the helm before. In fact, there is nothing wrong if the kid sits in the pilot's seat while the autopilot controls the liner. The question is different: what did the partner - the "technical reserve" of the happy father, while he was taking care of his son? Instead of keeping an eye on the instruments and, in which case, quickly take control of himself, he went to the corner of the cabin to film Eldar on a video camera. And missed the moment when the boy turned the Airbus on manual control and did not notice the deep roll into which the plane had gone. When the pilots realized it, it was already too late ...».
Effects
Changes were made to the documentation of the aircraft and the training plan for Aeroflot pilots. In particular, now in the flight manual for all Airbus A310s, a clause has been introduced about spontaneous disabling of automatic control of the ailerons when a force of more than 10 kg is applied to the yoke for 30 or more seconds. Simulator flights performed by Russian pilot-instructor Vladimir Biryukov together with Airbus test pilots revealed that if both pilots could not reach the controls, the automatic control system could quickly restore a straight-line safe flight
Transcript of negotiations
The plane flies over Novokuznetsk. The daughter of the commander, Jan, sits at the helm.
Co-pilot: Novokuznetsk, Aeroflot 593, passing your point at FL 10100.
FAC: Well, Yana, will you pilot?
Yana: No!
FAC: Don't press the buttons. Don't touch this red one!
Yana: Dad, can this be twisted?
FAC: Do you see Novokuznetsk on the left?
Yana: Are we flying so low?
FAC: Ten thousand one hundred meters.
Yana: That's a lot, right?
FAC: A lot...
Yana leaves the commander's chair.
FAC: Wait, don't rush...
Yana: I'm being careful...
Eldar's son sits in the commander's chair.
Makarov: The pilot is filming.
Eldar: Filming?
Makarov: I'm filming.
Eldar: Can this be twisted?
KVS: Yes! If you turn left, where will the plane go?
Eldar: Left!
FAC: Turn around! Turn left!
Eldar: Great!
FAC: Is the plane going to the left?
Eldar: Coming.
4 minutes pass.
Eldar: Why is he turning?
FAC: Does he turn himself?
Eldar: Yes.
FAC: Hold the helm!
Co-pilot: Speed!
FAC: Turn left! Left! Right! Left! The earth is here! Eldar, come out! Get out, Eldar! Come out! Come out! Come out! Come out! Come out, I say! Full throttle!
Co-pilot: He gave gas!
FAC: Full throttle!
Co-pilot: Yes!
FAC: The gas is full!
Co-pilot: The speed is very high!
KVS: Yes! Let's go! Right! Right foot! Get the gas out!
Co-pilot: Cleaned up!
FAC: Quietly-oh-oh-nechku!
Co-pilot: Fuck…again!
FAC: Don't turn right! Let's go out now! Everything is fine! Slowly, slowly! Slowly, I say!
Short crack.
End of record.
A passenger plane crashed in the Indian Ocean. Airbus A310-300 of Yemenia Airways, flying from Sanaa to the capital of the Comoros, fell into the water off the coast northern island Comorian archipelago. The fate of the 150 people on board is still unknown.
An Airbus A310-300 passenger plane crashed near the Comoros, located in the Mozambique Strait of the Indian Ocean. According to Reuters, Yemenia Airlines, which owned the plane, was making connecting flight. On Monday at 08.55 Yemeni time (09.55 Moscow time) Airbus A330-200, company-owned, took off on flight IY749 from Paris Charles de Gaulle Airport to the airport of the Yemeni capital Sana'a with an intermediate landing in Marseille. Having reached Sana at 19.50 Moscow time, the agency reports, the passengers of the A330-200 transferred to the A310-300 and at 21.30 Moscow time took flight IY626 to the Comoros. They were supposed to arrive at Moroni airport at 03.15 Moscow time.
However, an hour before the scheduled landing, the Airbus disappeared from the radar.
According to an unnamed employee of the local airport, quoted by Reuters, the pilot of the liner managed to tell the dispatchers that he would soon be landing, and then contact with him was lost.
Soon, official representatives of the authorities of the Comoros reported that the liner had crashed into Indian Ocean. According to the Qatari TV channel Al-Jazeera, the plane crashed off the coast of the northern island of the Comoros archipelago - Ngazidzha. So far, representatives of local authorities cannot name the exact place of the fall. According to the Agency for aviation security and navigation in Africa and Madagascar (ASECNA), rescuers have already gone to the alleged site of the tragedy. Nothing is known about the fate of the passengers of the liner. "Most likely, the plane is somewhere 8 kilometers from the coast. Civilian and military vessels have already set off in search," CNN quoted ASECNA spokesman Ibrahim Kassim as saying.
A headquarters has already been set up in Paris to help the relatives of passengers flying on Yemenia Airways. As reported on the website of the airline itself, its representatives do not intend to communicate with the press. Data on the number of passengers vary. So, AFP reports 147 passengers.
According to the Sky News channel, there were 11 crew members and 142 passengers on board the liner. The same figures are given on the official website of Yemenia Airways. It is only known for certain that the majority of those on board the liner were citizens of the Comoros and the French.
At about 10.30 Moscow time, rescuers found the wreckage of the plane and the bodies of two passengers.
This is the fourth incident for Yemenia Airways. From 2001 to 2006, not a single person was injured in accidents involving the company's aircraft. Yemenia Airways is 51% owned by the government of Yemen and 49% owned by the government Saudi Arabia. The company's air transport fleet consists of two Airbus A330-200s, four Airbus 310-300s and four Boeing 737-800s.
What is Airbus A310
The Airbus A310 is a small, wide-body, medium-long-haul passenger aircraft. It is one of the smallest wide-body aircraft in the world. In mid-1975, the designers of the Airbus Industry consortium began the preliminary development of the project passenger aircraft A300B10, which was a variant of the A300B4 with a shortened fuselage. At the same time, the development of the A310-200 liner with a flight range of more than 5 thousand kilometers began.
The first flight of the prototype A310-200 took place on April 3, 1982. Regular operation of the aircraft began the following year. In March 1983, designers from Airbus Industry began developing the A310-300 for long haul airlines. The main difference from the previous model was the presence of an additional fuel tank with a capacity of more than 6 thousand liters. in the horizontal tail and the use of an automated fuel transfer system to maintain the optimal balance of the aircraft in flight.
In 1985, the A310-300 entered regular service. Since 1991, the aircraft has been certified by the Aviaregistry of the Russian Federation, as a result of which it received the right to operate in Russian airlines. At various times, the A310 was operated by Aeroflot and Transaero. Currently, this type of aircraft is used only by S7 Airlines, which operates seven A310s.
The total number of A310 aircraft delivered to Airbus by 2008 is 255, of which 220 aircraft are in operation with 39 airlines. To date, all A310s in service have completed over four million flights with a total duration of about 10.5 million flight hours. Officially, the production of the A310 was completed in 2007.
Airbus A310 accidents
In July 1992 year Airbus A310 owned by a Thai airline veered off course due to a misunderstanding between the pilot and the controller and crashed near Kathmandu. All 113 people on board were killed.
In March 1994, the pilot of an A310 en route from Moscow to Hong Kong put his 16-year-old son at the helm, who accidentally turned off the autopilot. The plane went into a tailspin and crashed near Mezhdurechensk. All 75 people on the ship were killed.
In March 1995, in Romania, an A310 pilot lost control of the car, forgetting that he had turned off the autopilot. The plane crashed near the Romanian city of Balotesti. 60 people died.
In November 1998, while landing at the airport in Thailand, due to unfavorable weather conditions another A310 crashed. Killed 101 of the 146 people on board.
In January, another liner of this model fell into the sea near Abidjan. The accident occurred shortly after takeoff due to crew error. 169 of the 179 people aboard the A310 were killed.
There were no casualties during the emergency involving the A310 in Austria in December 2000. The chassis of the car jammed, and the pilots made an emergency landing in a field near locality Schwechat.
In July 2007, when landing in Irkutsk, the A310 engine went into takeoff mode, which caused the liner to crash to the ground. 125 out of 203 people died.
Another incident was recorded in June 2006. An A310 landing in Khartoum crashed and caught fire. 30 of the 214 people on board were killed.
The Commission has established the following:By the beginning of the playback of the magnetic recording of the conversations in the cockpit (17:26:52), the reserve PIC was in the left pilot's seat, and the co-pilot was in the right pilot's seat. The aircraft commander was resting in the passenger cabin.
From 17:40, the PIC-passenger and the children of the reserve PIC were in the cockpit. At 17:43:31, the reserve PIC left his workplace without transferring control of the aircraft to the co-pilot, which was then alternately occupied first by his daughter and then by his son (in violation of the requirements of NPP GA-85, clauses 7.1.3; 7.1.4 ; 7.1.5).
In the time interval between 17:43:34 and 17:43:37, Yana sat in the left chair and at 17:44:10 she asked her father to lift the chair up. At 17:47:06, the reserve PIC suggested that his daughter “pilot” the plane (“Well, Yana, will you pilot? Hold on to the helm, hold on”). In the period from 17:47:10 to 17:50:44, using the autopilot course setter to demonstrate the daughter of aircraft control, a maneuver was performed to the left from a heading of 111 ° to 102 °, then to the right to 115 ° followed by (after 2 minutes 40 seconds . after the start of the maneuver) by the aircraft reaching the set heading of 102°. After the aircraft entered this course, Yana vacated the PIC seat at 17:51:12, remaining in the cockpit.
For 7.5 minutes, when the daughter of the reserve PIC occupied the pilot's seat of the PIC, conversations were held between the father and daughter, distracting the crew from controlling the flight parameters.
From 17:50:04 to 17:50:46 the co-pilot made a report to Novosibirsk-control and Novokuznetsk-control controllers about the passage of Novokuznetsk and the planned time of passing the Zakir checkpoint at 17:59.
At 17:51:55, the left seat of the PIC was taken by the son of the reserve PIC, Eldar. the reserve PIC decided to demonstrate to him the principles of piloting an aircraft by performing a similar maneuver just shown to his daughter. At 17:54:25, at the request of his son to “turn” the steering wheel, the reserve PIC gave permission and at 17:54:35 said: “So, watch the land where you will turn. Let's go left, turn left!"
The son of the reserve PIC, starting from 17:54:39, made efforts to the left helm, deviating it to the left by 3 ... 4 ° for 5 seconds. At the same time, the autopilot worked to parry the created roll by deflecting the right aileron. At 17:54:44, the standby PIC switched on the “heading setter” submode and turned the autopilot heading setter handle to turn to the left by more than 15° from the initial heading of 105°, which created a left bank of 21.5° and reduced the efforts at the helm. At 17:54:52, with a left bank of 17…19°, the standby PIC turned the control knob to the right to return to the initial heading of 105°. The autopilot deflected the ailerons to reduce the left roll.
Thus, unlike the previous maneuver, with the permission of the reserve PIC, his son made efforts to the left helm, keeping it in a position close to neutral
The co-pilot held the right helm at that time, possibly securing it against deviations by the son of the reserve PIC - from 17:54:58 the left or right or both helms were held at a position of 3 ... 5 ° to the right.
From 17:55:05 the plane changed from left to right bank.
Holding the controls while the aircraft was performing turns with rolls variable in magnitude and direction led to the counteraction of the steering machine of the autopilot, the appearance on the held controls of variable forces in magnitude and direction, and caused unintentional unsignaled (instrumentally) disconnection of the autopilot from the aileron control wiring, which occurred at 17 :55:25 with an increase in the total forces on the steering wheels up to 11 ... 13 kg.
Studies have shown that the disconnection of the autopilot from the control of the ailerons while holding the steering wheel (handwheels) occurs with efforts that are less than those stated in the Flight Manual (AFM) and other regulatory documents (15 ... 17 kg). By holding both controls, the forces between them can be distributed in such a way that the moment of disconnection may not be noticed by the pilot.
The RLE lacks proper information, and the flight crew training program does not contain the methodology and training for recognizing the disconnection of the autopilot from control along the roll channel and the specifics of piloting an aircraft with the autopilot disconnected along the roll.
Since in the process of overpowering and after disconnecting the autopilot, the controls were held in a position corresponding to a slight deflection of the ailerons to the right roll, the aircraft continued to increase the roll. The increase in roll remained unnoticed by the crew due to the distraction of their attention by unauthorized persons in the cockpit and the absence of light and sound alarms on the aircraft about the disconnection of the autopilot. Moreover, the alarm system on the aircraft, even after disconnecting the autopilot, continued to provide the crew with information about its operation in the previously set mode, although the autopilot ceased to perform its function of stabilizing and controlling in the roll channel.
When the bank reached 20°, at 17:55:36, the ailerons were additionally deflected by 1.5…2° to the right roll. It was not possible to establish to which of the helms efforts were made to additionally deflect the ailerons. Due to the additional steering wheel deflection, the right bank of the aircraft began to increase more intensively, by 17:55:49 it exceeded its operational limit - 45° and continued to go unnoticed by the crew. After reaching this roll, the autopilot could not fully perform its functions to stabilize the height. The aircraft went into a descent.
From 17:55:12 to 17:55:36 the reserve PIC was distracted from control over his son's actions and flight parameters by talking to his daughter.
At 17:55:36, Eldar, who was still in the left pilot's seat, was the first to notice "something incomprehensible" and drew the attention of his father, who was busy talking with Yana, to this: "Why is he turning?" the reserve PIC replied: “Does it turn itself?” Eldar confirmed "Yes". The pilots who were in the cockpit since that time have joined in the search for an explanation why the plane "turns". At 17:55:45, the PIC-passenger suggested that the aircraft had gone into the waiting area and the co-pilot supported him.
The autopilot, which continued to perform its functions in the pitch channel to maintain the flight altitude during the roll development after the servo was disconnected, brought the aircraft to the aerodynamic shaking mode and high angles of attack.
The crew detected a dangerous situation only by the increase in G-force and the appearance of aircraft shaking (buffing) from 17:55:52. By this time, the roll had reached more than 50 °, the angle of attack was 4 ... 4.5 °, and the vertical overload was 1.6 units. Simultaneously with the appearance of buffeting, the angle of attack changed from 4.5° to 10° in 2 seconds with practically unchanged deviations of the elevator and stabilizer, which indicates the manifestation of a "pickup" in the angle of attack.
the reserve PIC gave the command “Hold! Hold the helm! Hold on! and after 2 sec. after the appearance of buffeting at a bank of 63°, the co-pilot took vigorous measures to bring the aircraft out of the right bank by fully deflecting the yoke to the left. At the same time, having understood the command addressed to him and literally the son of the reserve PIC, he clamped the left helm in a position close to neutral for 3 ... 4 seconds, as a result of which the left aileron and three of the five spoilers on the left wing were not deflected. This, combined with an increase in the angle of attack, reduced the effectiveness of the lateral control of the aircraft (although it did not have a decisive effect), which did not allow to reduce the right bank, which reached 90 ° 19 seconds after turning the helm to the left.
The actions of the crew to parry the roll as a whole were inadequate to the situation. Expedient actions to bring the aircraft to operational angles of attack and restore lateral controllability would be to turn off the autopilot, return the steering wheel “away from you” to reduce the angle of attack, then bring the aircraft out of roll and descend.
In the process of parrying the roll, the autopilot, upon a signal about a decrease in the set flight altitude, rejected the elevator for pitching, which accelerated the aircraft's exit to high angles of attack and stall. At the same time, following the commands of the reserve PIC and the PIC-passenger “Reverse, turn to the left!”, which they gave over the next 21 seconds, the son of the reserve PIC deflected the helm, thereby preventing the co-pilot from flying, who, with a short stature (160 cm) and shifted almost to the rearmost position of the chair, and so had limited opportunities for piloting an aircraft.
Between 17:55:58 and 17:56:11, the Altitude Departure (twice), Stall Warning and Autopilot Disabled alarms occurred.
At the same time, with a right bank of 80 ... 90 °, the aircraft increased the pitch angle for a dive from -15 ° to -50 ° with an acceleration of speed at a vertical overload of about 2 units.
The intervention of the crew in the pitch control by deflecting the yoke column led to the disabling of the autopilot at 17:56:11 with the issuance of a corresponding alarm.
After disabling the autopilot, the automatic high-angle-of-attack protection system worked, which deflected the stabilizer into a dive from -1° to -0.5°. At the same time, the elevator was also rejected for a dive from -7.5 ° to + 2.5 °. These actions led to a decrease in the angle of attack to + 7 °, an increase in the average vertical speed of descent to 200 m / s, an increase in vertical overload and speed above the maximum permissible values. At the same time, from 17:56:04 to 17:56:18, the spatial orientation in roll was lost by the crew. Having restored the orientation, the co-pilot, by deflecting the steering wheel to the left, brought the aircraft out of the roll. The aircraft remained in a dive with a pitch angle of up to 40°. The speed reached 740 km/h by 17:56:29. The co-pilot, taking the helm “on himself”, rejected the elevator for pitching up to the mechanical stop, which created an overload of 4.6 ... 4.7 units above the established strength limits.
The reserve PIC continued to try to take his job, giving cue to his son “Get out, get out!”, but Eldar could not get out of the seat due to significant vertical g-forces and a narrow space between the seat and the port side.
Almost simultaneously with the deviation of the elevator for pitching, the crew reduced the operating mode of the engines. The action of these two factors led to an intensive drop in airspeed to 185…220 km/h by 17:56:41. At this moment, someone (either Eldar, getting up from his chair, or the reserve PIC, taking it) abruptly deflected the rudder at an angle of about 8 ° by involuntary giving the pedal. The aircraft went into a sharp right bank with the ailerons deflected to the left, performing a spin roll. After stalling and performing a spin roll at angles of attack of 30…35°, the aircraft switched to left rotation with an increase in the dive angle to 80…90° and a decrease in vertical g-force to zero, i.e. to weightlessness.
At 17:56:54 the co-pilot, noticing the decrease in speed below 180 km/h, gave the command “Full throttle!” three times. The aircraft at that moment was practically in a steep dive and the initial phase of acceleration. The position of the reserve PIC in the seat, which had taken its place by 17:56:40…17:56:46, with his height of 170 cm and the seat shifted to almost the rearmost position, did not ensure normal control of the aircraft.
By 17:57:11 the speed reached 370 km/h, the aircraft slowed down its roll rotation (the bank leveled off within 20…22°, the pitch angle decreased to -20°. The reserve PIC attempted to stop it by alternating pedal deflection against rotation, which he managed to do at 17:57:56 at an altitude of about 300…400 m. Having made two spins to the left after stalling, with an average vertical speed of 75 m/s at 17:58:01 (0:58 on March 23 local time), the aircraft collided with the ground, completely collapsed and partially burned out. the passengers died.
