Radar control of airspace. Foreign multi-position radar systems for covert airspace control

BC/ NW 2015 № 2 (27): 13 . 2

AIRSPACE CONTROL THROUGH SPACE

Klimov F.N., Kochev M. Yu., Garkin E.V., Lunkov A.P.

High-precision air attack weapons, such as cruise missiles and unmanned attack aircraft, in the process of their development began to have a long range of 1,500 to 5,000 kilometers. The low visibility of such targets during the flight requires their detection and identification on the acceleration trajectory. It is possible to fix such a target at a long distance, either by over-the-horizon radar stations (OG radars), or using satellite-based radar or optical systems.

Attack unmanned aircraft and cruise missiles fly most often at speeds close to the speeds of passenger aircraft hence an attack by such means may be disguised as normal air traffic. This puts before the airspace control systems the task of detecting and identifying such means of attack from the moment of launch and at the maximum distance from the lines of effective destruction of them by means of VKS. To solve this problem, it is necessary to use all existing and developed airspace control and surveillance systems, including over-the-horizon radars and satellite constellations.

The launch of a cruise missile or attack unmanned aircraft can be carried out from the torpedo tube of a patrol boat, from the external suspension of the aircraft or from a launcher disguised as a standard sea container located on a civilian dry cargo ship, car trailer, railway platform. The satellites of the missile attack warning system already today record and track the coordinates of launches of unmanned aircraft or cruise missiles in the mountains and in the ocean using the engine torch in the acceleration section. Consequently, the satellites of the missile attack warning system need to monitor not only the territory of a potential enemy, but also the waters of the oceans and continents globally.

The placement of radar systems on satellites to control the aerospace space today is associated with technological and financial difficulties. But in modern conditions, such a new technology as broadcast automatic dependent surveillance (ADS-B) can be used to control the airspace via satellites. Information from commercial aircraft using the ADS-B system can be collected using satellites by placing on board receivers operating at ADS-B frequencies and repeaters of the received information to ground airspace control centers. Thus, it is possible to create a global field of electronic surveillance of the planet's airspace. Satellite constellations can become sources of flight information about aircraft in fairly large areas.

Airspace information coming from ADS-B system receivers located on satellites makes it possible to control aircraft over oceans and in terrain folds mountain ranges continents. This information will allow us to isolate the means of air attack from the flow of commercial aircraft with their subsequent identification.

ADS-B identification information on commercial aircraft coming through satellites will create an opportunity to reduce the risks of terrorist attacks and sabotage in our time. In addition, such information will make it possible to detect emergency aircraft and aviation accident sites in the ocean far from the coast.

Let us evaluate the possibility of using various satellite systems for receiving aircraft flight information using the ADS-B system and relaying this information to ground-based airspace control systems. Modern aircraft transmit flight information using the ADS-B system using on-board transponders with a power of 20 W at a frequency of 1090 MHz.

The ADS-B system operates at frequencies that freely penetrate the Earth's ionosphere. The transmitters of the ADS-B system located on board the aircraft have limited power, therefore, the receivers located on board the satellites must have sufficient sensitivity.

Using the energy calculation of the Samolet-Sputnik satellite communication line, we can estimate the maximum range at which the satellite can receive information from aircraft. The peculiarity of the satellite link used is the restrictions on the mass, dimensions and power consumption of both the onboard transponder of the aircraft and the onboard satellite transponder.

To determine the maximum range at which it is possible to receive messages by the ADS-B satellite, we will use the well-known equation for the line of satellite communication systems on the ground-satellite section:

where

is the effective signal power at the transmitter output ;

is the effective signal power at the receiver input;

– transmitting antenna gain;

– slant range from the spacecraft to the receiving AP;

-wavelength on the line "DOWN"

waves on the "Down" line;

is the effective aperture area of ​​the transmitting antenna;

is the transmission coefficient of the waveguide path between the transmitter and the SC antenna;

– efficiency of the waveguide path between the receiver and the ES antenna;

Transforming the formula, we find the slant range at which the satellite can receive flight information:

d = .

We substitute in the formula the parameters corresponding to the standard onboard transponder and the receiving trunk of the satellite. As calculations show, the maximum transmission range on the aircraft-satellite link is 2256 km. Such a slant transmission range on the aircraft-to-satellite link is possible only when operating through low-orbit constellations of satellites. At the same time, we use standard aircraft equipment without complicating the requirements for commercial aircraft.

The ground station for receiving information has significantly smaller restrictions on weight and dimensions than the onboard equipment of satellites and aircraft. Such a station can be equipped with more sensitive receivers and high gain antennas. Therefore, the communication range on the satellite-to-ground link depends only on the conditions of the line of sight of the satellite.

Using data from the orbits of satellite constellations, we can estimate the maximum slant range of communication between a satellite and a ground receiving station using the formula:

,

where H is the height of the satellite orbit;

is the radius of the Earth's surface.

The results of calculations of the maximum slant range for points at different geographical latitudes are presented in Table 1.

Orbcom

Iridium

Messenger

globalstar

Signal

Orbit height, km

1400

1414

1500

Earth radius north pole, km

6356,86

2994,51

3244,24

4445,13

4469,52

4617,42

Radius of the Earth Arctic Circle, km

6365,53

2996,45

3246,33

4447,86

4472,26

4620,24

Earth radius 80°, km

6360,56

2995,34

3245,13

4446,30

4470,69

4618,62

Radius of the Earth 70°, km

6364,15

2996,14

3245,99

4447,43

4471,82

4619,79

Earth radius 60°, km

6367,53

2996,90

3246,81

4448,49

4472,89

4620,89

Earth radius 50°, km

6370,57

2997,58

3247,54

4449,45

4473,85

4621,87

Earth radius 40°, km

6383,87

3000,55

3250,73

4453,63

4478,06

4626,19

Earth radius 30°, km

6375,34

2998,64

3248,68

4450,95

4475,36

4623,42

Earth radius 20°, km

6376,91

2998,99

3249,06

4451,44

4475,86

4623,93

Earth radius 10°, km

6377,87

2999,21

3249,29

4451,75

4476,16

4624,24

Earth radius equator, km

6378,2

2999,28

3249,37

4451,85

4476,26

4624,35

The maximum transmission range on the aircraft-to-satellite link is less than the maximum slant range on the satellite-to-ground link of the Orbkom, Iridium and Gonets satellite systems. The maximum data slant range is closest to the calculated maximum data transmission range for the Orbcom satellite system.

Calculations show that it is possible to create an airspace surveillance system using satellite relaying of ADS-B messages from aircraft to ground-based flight information processing centers. Such a surveillance system will increase the range of controlled space from a ground station to 4,500 kilometers without the use of inter-satellite communications, which will increase the airspace control area. With the use of inter-satellite communication channels, we will be able to control the airspace globally.


Fig. 1 "Airspace control using satellites"


Fig. 2 "Airspace control with inter-satellite communication"

The proposed method of airspace control allows:

Expand the coverage area of ​​the airspace control system, including the waters of the oceans and the territory of mountain ranges up to 4500 km from the receiving ground station;

When using an inter-satellite communication system, it is possible to control the airspace of the Earth globally;

Receive flight information from aircraft regardless of foreign airspace surveillance systems;

Select air objects tracked by the overhead radar according to the degree of their danger at the far detection lines.

Literature:

1. Fedosov E.A. "Half a century in aviation". M: Bustard, 2004.

2. “Satellite communications and broadcasting. Directory. Edited by L.Ya.Kantor. M: Radio and communication, 1988.

3. Andreev V.I. “Order of the Federal Air Transport Service of the Russian Federation dated October 14, 1999 No. No. 80 "On the creation and implementation of a system of broadcasting automatic dependent surveillance in civil aviation Russia".

4. Traskovsky A. "Moscow's aviation mission: the basic principle of safe management." "Aviapanorama". 2008. No. 4.

of these Federal Rules

144. Control over compliance with the requirements of these Federal Rules is carried out federal agency air transport, air traffic services (flight control) in the zones and areas established for them.

Control over the use of airspace Russian Federation in terms of identifying aircraft violating the procedure for using airspace (hereinafter referred to as violating aircraft) and aircraft violating the rules of crossing state border of the Russian Federation is carried out by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

145. If the air traffic services (flight control) body detects a violation of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation, information about this violation is immediately brought to the attention of the air defense body and the aircraft commander, if radio contact is established with him.

146. Air defense agencies provide radar control of the airspace and provide the relevant centers of the Unified System with data on the movement of aircraft and other material objects:

a) threatening illegal crossing or illegally crossing the state border of the Russian Federation;

b) being unidentified;

c) violating the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation (until the violation ceases);

d) transmitting a distress signal;

e) flying letters "A" and "K";

f) performing flights for search and rescue operations.

147. Violations of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation include:

a) the use of airspace without the permission of the relevant center of the Unified System under the permitting procedure for the use of airspace, except for the cases specified in paragraph 114 of these Federal Rules;

b) non-compliance with the conditions brought by the center of the Unified System in the permit for the use of airspace;

c) non-compliance with the commands of air traffic services (flight control) and the commands of the aircraft on duty of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation;

d) non-compliance with the procedure for using the airspace of the border strip;

e) non-compliance with the established temporary and local regimes, as well as short-term restrictions;

f) flight of a group of aircraft in excess of the number specified in the flight plan of the aircraft;

g) use of the airspace of a prohibited zone, a restricted flight zone without permission;

h) landing of an aircraft at an unscheduled (undeclared) aerodrome (site), except for cases of forced landing, as well as cases agreed with the air traffic services (flight control) authority;

i) non-compliance by the aircraft crew with the rules of vertical and horizontal separation (with the exception of cases of occurrence on board the aircraft emergency requiring an immediate change in profile and flight mode);

(see text in previous edition)

j) unauthorized deviation of the aircraft from the boundaries of the airway, local overhead line and the route, except for cases when such a deviation is due to flight safety considerations (bypassing dangerous meteorological weather phenomena, etc.);

k) entry of an aircraft into controlled airspace without the permission of the air traffic services (flight control) authority;

M) flight of an aircraft in class G airspace without notifying the air traffic services unit.

148. When an intruder aircraft is detected, the air defense authorities give the “Mode” signal, which means the requirement to stop violating the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation.

The air defense authorities bring the "Regime" signal to the appropriate centers of the Unified System and take action to stop the violation of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation.

(see text in previous edition)

The centers of the Unified System warn the commander of the intruder aircraft (if there is radio communication with him) about the "Regime" signal given by the air defense authorities and assist him in stopping the violation of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation.

(see text in previous edition)

149. The decision on the further use of the airspace of the Russian Federation, if the commander of the offending aircraft has stopped violating the procedure for its use, is taken by:

a) the head of the duty shift of the main center of the Unified System - when performing international flights along air traffic services routes;

b) chiefs of duty shifts of the regional and zonal centers of the Unified System - when performing domestic flights along air traffic service routes;

c) the operational duty officer of the air defense body - in other cases.

(see text in previous edition)

150. On the decision made in accordance with paragraph 149 of these Federal Rules, the centers of the Unified System and the air defense authorities notify each other, as well as the user of the airspace.

(see text in previous edition)

151. When illegally crossing the state border of the Russian Federation, using weapons and military equipment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on aircraft- to the intruder, as well as when unidentified aircraft and other material objects appear in the airspace, in exceptional cases, the air defense authorities give the "Carpet" signal, which means the requirement for the immediate landing or withdrawal of all aircraft in the air from the corresponding area, with the exception of aircraft involved in the fight against intruder aircraft and performing search and rescue tasks.

(see text in previous edition)

The air defense authorities bring the "Carpet" signal, as well as the boundaries of the area of ​​operation of the specified signal to the corresponding centers of the Unified System.

(see text in previous edition)

The centers of the Unified System immediately take measures to withdraw aircraft (their landing) from the coverage area of ​​the "Carpet" signal.

(see text in previous edition)

152. If the crew of the offending aircraft fails to comply with the command of the air traffic services (flight control) to stop violating the procedure for using the airspace, such information is immediately communicated to the air defense authorities. The air defense authorities apply measures to the intruder aircraft in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation.

Aircraft crews are obliged to obey the commands of the aircraft on duty of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, used to stop violations of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation.

If an intruder aircraft is forced to land, its landing is carried out at an airfield (heliport, landing site) suitable for landing this type of aircraft.

153. In the event of a threat to flight safety, including those associated with an act of unlawful interference on board an aircraft, the crew gives a distress signal. On aircraft equipped with a hazard signaling system, in the event of an attack on the crew, the "CCO" signal is additionally given. Upon receipt of the signal "Distress" and (or) "SSO" from the crew of the aircraft, the air traffic services (flight control) authorities are obliged to accept necessary measures to provide assistance to the crew in distress, and immediately transfer to the centers of the Unified System, aviation coordination centers for search and rescue, as well as to the air defense authorities, data on his whereabouts and other necessary information.

154. After clarification of the reasons for the violation of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation, permission for the further operation of an international flight or a flight associated with the crossing of more than 2 zones of the Unified System is accepted by the head of the shift on duty of the main center of the Unified System, and in other cases - the heads of shifts on duty of the zonal center of the Unified System systems.

SCIENCE AND MILITARY SECURITY No. 1/2007, pp. 28-33

UDC 621.396.96

THEM. ANOSHKIN,

Head of Department of the Scientific Research Institute

Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus,

Candidate of Technical Sciences, Senior Researcher

The principles of construction are given and the capabilities of advanced multi-position air defense radar systems are evaluated, which will allow the armed forces of the United States and its allies to solve qualitatively new tasks of covert surveillance and airspace control.

The constant growth of requirements for the volume and quality of radar information about the air and interference situation, ensuring high security of information assets from the effects of enemy electronic warfare forces foreign military specialists not only to look for new technical solutions in the creation of various components of radar stations (RLS), which are the main information sensors in air defense systems, air traffic control, etc., but also to develop new non-traditional areas in this field of development and creation military equipment.

One of these promising areas is multi-position radar. Research and development carried out by the United States and a number of NATO countries (Great Britain, France, Germany) in this area are aimed at improving the information content, noise immunity and survivability of radar facilities and systems for various purposes through the use of bistatic and multi-position modes of operation in their work. In addition, it provides reliable monitoring of low-observable air targets (ATs), including cruise missiles and aircraft manufactured using the Stealth technology, operating under conditions of electronic and fire suppression by the enemy, as well as reflections from the underlying surface and local items. A multi-position radar system (MPRS) should be understood as a set of transmitting and receiving points that ensure the creation of a radar field with the required parameters. The basis of the MPRS (as its separate cells) are bistatic radars as part of a transmitter - receiver, spaced apart in space. When the transmitters are turned off, such a system, in the presence of appropriate communication lines between receiving points, can operate in a passive mode, determining the coordinates of objects emitting electromagnetic waves.

To ensure increased secrecy of the operation of such systems in combat conditions, various principles of their construction are considered: ground, air, space and mixed variants of basing, using the probing radiation of standard radars, active jammers of the enemy, as well as radio engineering systems (Fig. 1), unconventional for radar (television and radio broadcasting transmitting stations, various systems and means of communication, etc.). The most intensive work in this direction conducted in the USA.

The ability to have a radar field system that matches the coverage field formed by the illumination zones of television, radio broadcasting transmitting stations (RTPS), cellular base stations telephone communication etc., due to the fact that the height of their antenna towers can reach 50 ... 250 m, and the omnidirectional illumination zone formed by them is pressed to the earth's surface. The simplest recalculation using the line-of-sight range formula shows that aircraft flying at extremely low altitudes fall into the field of illumination of such transmitters, starting from a distance of 50 - 80 km.

Unlike combined (monostatic) radars, the detection zone of MPRS targets, in addition to the energy potential and conditions of radar observation, largely depends on the geometry of their construction, the number and relative position of transmitting and receiving points. The concept of "maximum detection range" here is a value that cannot be unambiguously determined by the energy potential, as is the case for combined radars. The maximum detection range of the EC of a bistatic radar as a unit cell of the MPRS is determined by the shape of the Cassini oval (lines of constant signal-to-noise ratios), which corresponds to a family of isodality curves or lines of constant total ranges (ellipses) that determine the position of the target on the oval (Fig. 2) in in accordance with the expression

The radar equation for determining the maximum range of a bistatic radar is

where rl,r2 - distances from the transmitter to the target and from the target to the receiver;

Pt- transmitter power, W;

G t, GT- gains of the transmitting and receiving antennas;

Pmin - limiting sensitivity of the receiving device;

k- Boltzmann's constant;

v1, v2 - loss coefficients during propagation of radio waves on the way from the transmitter to the target and from the target to the receiver.

The area of ​​the detection zone of the MPRS, consisting of one transmitting and several receiving points (or vice versa), can significantly exceed the area of ​​the detection zone of an equivalent combined radar.

It should be noted that the value of the effective scattering area (ESR) in a bistatic radar for the same target differs from its RCS measured in a single-position radar. When it approaches the base line (transmitter-receiver line) L there is an effect of a sharp increase in RCS (Fig. 3), and the maximum value of the latter is observed when the target is on the base line and is determined by the formula

where BUT - cross-sectional area of ​​the object, perpendicular to the direction of propagation of radio waves, m;

λ - wavelength, m.

The use of this effect makes it possible to more effectively detect low-profile targets, including those made using the Stealth technology. A multi-position radar system can be implemented on the basis of various options for the geometry of its construction using both mobile and stationary reception points.

The concept of MPRS has been developed in the United States since the early 1950s in the interest of using them to solve various problems, primarily the control of aerospace. The work carried out was mainly theoretical, and in some cases experimental. Interest in multi-position radar systems arose again in the late 1990s with the advent of high-performance computers and complex signal processing tools (radar, jamming, radio and television transmitting stations, mobile communication radio signals, etc.), capable of processing large amounts of radar information to achieve acceptable accuracy characteristics of such systems. In addition, the advent of the space radio navigation system GPS (Global Position System) makes it possible to perform accurate topographical positioning and tight time synchronization of MPRS elements, which is a necessary condition for correlation signal processing in such systems. Radar characteristics of signals emitted by television (TV) and frequency modulated (FM) broadcasting transmitting stations with radiotelephone stations of cellular GSM communication are shown in Table 1.

The main characteristic of radio signals from the point of view of their use in radar systems is their uncertainty function (time-frequency mismatch function or the so-called "uncertainty body"), which determines the resolution in terms of delay time (range) and Doppler frequency (radial velocity). In general, it is described by the following expression

On fig. Figures 4-5 show the uncertainty functions of television image and sound signals, VHF FM radio signals, and digital broadband audio broadcasting signals.

As follows from the analysis of the above dependences, the uncertainty function of the TV image signal has a multi-peak character, due to its frame and line periodicity. The continuous nature of the TV signal makes it possible to carry out frequency selection of echo signals with high accuracy, however, the presence of frame periodicity in it leads to the appearance of interfering components in its mismatch function, following after 50 Hz. A change in the average brightness of the transmitted TV image leads to a change in the average radiation power and a change in the level of the main and side peaks of its time-frequency mismatch function. An important advantage of the TV sound signal and frequency-modulated VHF broadcasting signals is the single-peak nature of their uncertainty bodies, which facilitates the resolution of echo signals both in terms of delay time and Doppler frequency. However, their nonstationarity over the spectrum width has a strong effect on the shape and width of the central peak of the uncertainty functions.

Such signals in the traditional sense are not intended for solving radar problems, since they do not provide the required resolution and accuracy in determining the coordinates of targets. However, joint real-time processing of signals emitted by various different types of means, reflected from the computer center and simultaneously received at several receiving points, makes it possible to provide the required accuracy characteristics of the system as a whole. To do this, it is planned to use new adaptive algorithms for digital processing of radar information and the use of high-performance computing tools of a new generation.

A feature of MPRS with external target illumination transmitters is the presence of powerful direct (penetrating) transmitter signals, the level of which can be 40 - 90 dB higher than the level of signals reflected from targets. To reduce the interfering effect of penetrating transmitter signals and re-reflections from the underlying surface and local objects in order to expand the detection zone, it is necessary to apply special measures: spatial rejection of interfering signals, auto-compensation methods with frequency-selective feedback at high and intermediate frequencies, suppression at video frequency, etc.

Despite the fact that work in this direction has been carried out for a rather long period, only recently, after the appearance of relatively inexpensive ultra-high-speed digital processors that allow processing large amounts of information, for the first time there was a real opportunity to create experimental samples that meet modern tactical and technical requirements.

Over the past fifteen years, specialists from the American company Lockheed Martin have been developing a promising three-coordinate radar system for detecting and tracking air targets based on multi-position construction principles, which was called Silent Sentry.

It has fundamentally new capabilities for covert monitoring of the air situation. The system does not have its own transmitting devices, which makes it possible to work in a passive mode and does not allow the enemy to determine the location of its elements by means of electronic intelligence. The covert use of the Silent Sentry MPRS is also facilitated by the absence of rotating elements and antennas with mechanical scanning of the antenna pattern in its receiving points. As the main sources that provide the formation of probing signals and illumination of targets, continuous signals with amplitude and frequency modulation are used, emitted by television and radio broadcasting ultra-short-wave transmitting stations, as well as signals from other radio equipment located in the coverage area of ​​the system, including air defense and control radars. air traffic, radio beacons, means of navigation, communications, etc. The principles of combat use of the Silent Sentry system are shown in fig. 6.

According to the developers, the system will allow you to simultaneously accompany big number CC, the number of which will be limited only by the capabilities of radar information processing devices. At the same time, the throughput of the Silent Sentry system (compared to traditional radar facilities, in which this indicator largely depends on the parameters of the radar antenna system and signal processing devices) will not be limited by the parameters of antenna systems and receiving devices. In addition, compared to conventional radars that provide a detection range of low-flying targets up to 40 - 50 km, the Silent Sentry system will allow them to be detected and tracked at ranges up to 220 km due to a higher power level of signals emitted by television and radio broadcasting transmitters. stations (tens of kilowatts in continuous mode), and by placing their antenna devices on special towers (up to 300 m or more) and natural heights (hills and mountains) to ensure the maximum possible zones of reliable reception of television and radio programs. Their radiation pattern is pressed to the ground surface, which also improves the system's ability to detect low-flying targets.

The first experimental sample of the mobile receiving module of the system, which includes four containers with the same type of computing units (0.5X0.5X0.5 m each) and an antenna system (9X2.5 m), was created at the end of 1998. In the case of their mass production, the cost of one receiving module of the system will be, depending on the composition of the means used, from 3 to 5 million dollars.

A stationary version of the receiving module of the Silent Sentry system has also been created, the characteristics of which are given in Table. 2. It uses a larger phased array antenna (PAA) than the mobile version, as well as computing facilities that provide twice the performance of the mobile version. The antenna system is mounted on the side surface of the building, the flat headlight of which is directed to the side international airport them. J.Washington in Baltimore (at a distance of about 50 km from the transmitting point).

The composition of a separate receiving module of a stationary type of the Silent Sentry system includes:

antenna system with phased array (linear or flat) of the target channel, which provides reception of signals reflected from targets;

antennas of "reference" channels, providing reception of direct (reference) signals from target illumination transmitters;

a receiving device with a large dynamic range and systems for suppressing interfering signals from target illumination transmitters;

analog-to-digital converter of radar signals;

a high-performance digital processor for processing radar information manufactured by Silicon Graphics, which provides real-time data output of at least 200 air targets;

air situation display devices;

processor for analyzing the background-target situation, which optimizes the selection at each specific moment of operation of certain types of probing radiation signals and target illumination transmitters located in the system coverage area in order to obtain the maximum signal-to-noise ratio at the output of the radar information processing device;

means of registration, recording and storage of information;

training and simulation equipment;

means of autonomous power supply.

The receiving phased array includes several subarrays developed on the basis of existing types commercial antenna systems of various ranges and purposes. As experimental samples, conventional television antenna devices are additionally included in it. One PAA receiving cloth is capable of providing a field of view in the azimuth sector up to 105 degrees, and in the elevation sector up to 50 degrees, and the most effective level of reception of signals reflected from targets is provided in the azimuth sector up to 60 degrees. To ensure overlapping of the circular view area in azimuth, it is possible to use several PAR canvases.

The appearance of the antenna systems, the receiving device and the screen of the situation display device of the stationary and mobile versions of the receiving module of the Silent Sentry system is shown in Figure 7. The system was tested in real conditions in March 1999 (Fort Stewart, Georgia). This provided observation (detection, tracking, determination of spatial coordinates, speed and acceleration) in a passive mode for various aerodynamic and ballistic targets.

The main task of further work on the creation of the Silent Sentry system is currently associated with improving its capabilities, in particular, introducing it into the target recognition mode. This problem is partially solved in already created samples, but not in real time. In addition, a version of the system is being worked out, in which it is planned to use airborne radars of early warning and control aircraft as target illumination transmitters.

In the UK, work in the field of multi-position radar systems for this purpose has been carried out since the late 1980s. Various experimental models of bistatic radar systems were developed and deployed, the receiving modules of which were deployed in the area of ​​London Heathrow Airport (Fig. 8). As target illumination transmitters, regular radio and television transmitting stations and air traffic control radars were used. In addition, experimental models of forward-scattering Doppler radars were developed that use the effect of an increase in the RCS of targets as they approach the base line of a bistatic system with television illumination. Research in the field of creating MPRS using radio and television transmitting stations as sources of exposure to CC was carried out at the research institute of the Norwegian Ministry of Defense, as reported at a session of leading Norwegian institutions and developers on promising projects for the creation and development of new radio-electronic military equipment and technologies in June 2000 G.

Base stations of mobile cellular communications of the decimeter wavelength range can also be used as sources of signals sounding the airspace. Work in this direction to create their own versions of passive radar systems is carried out by specialists from the German company Siemens, the British firms Roke Manor Research and BAE Systems, and the French space agency ONERA.

It is planned to determine the location of the CC by calculating the phase difference of the signals emitted by several base stations, the coordinates of which are known with high accuracy. In this case, the main technical problem is to ensure the synchronization of such measurements within a few nanoseconds. It is supposed to be solved by applying the technologies of highly stable time standards (atomic clocks installed on board spacecraft), developed during the creation of the Navstar space radio navigation system.

Such systems will have a high level of survivability, since during their operation there are no signs of the use of mobile telephone base stations as radar transmitters. If the enemy is somehow able to establish this fact, he will be forced to destroy all transmitters of the telephone network, which seems unlikely, given the current scale of their deployment. It is practically impossible to identify and destroy the receiving devices of such radar systems using technical means, since during their operation they use the signals of a standard mobile telephone network. The use of jammers, according to the developers, will also turn out to be ineffective due to the fact that in the operation of the MPRS options under consideration, a mode is possible in which the REB devices themselves turn out to be additional sources of illumination of air targets.

In October 2003, Roke Manor Research demonstrated a version of the Celldar passive radar system (short for Cellular phone radar) to the leadership of the British Ministry of Defense during military exercises at the Salisbury Plain training ground. The cost of a demonstration prototype, consisting of two conventional parabolic antennas, two mobile phones (acting as "cells") and a PC with an analog-to-digital converter, amounted to a little more than 3 thousand dollars. According to foreign experts, the military department of any country that has developed infrastructure mobile telephony, capable of creating a similar
nye radar systems. In this case, telephone network transmitters can be used without the knowledge of their operators. It will be possible to expand the capabilities of systems like Celldar through auxiliary tools, such as, for example, acoustic sensors.

Thus, the creation and adoption of multi-position radar systems of the Silent Sentry or Celldar type will allow the armed forces of the United States and its allies to solve qualitatively new tasks of covert surveillance and control of airspace in zones of possible armed conflicts in certain regions of the world. In addition, they can be involved in solving the problems of air traffic control, combating the spread of drugs, etc.

As the experience of wars of the last 15 years shows, traditional air defense systems have low noise immunity and survivability, primarily from the impact of high-precision weapons. Therefore, the disadvantages of active radar should be neutralized as much as possible by additional means - passive means of reconnaissance of targets at low and extremely low altitudes. The development of multi-position radar systems using the external radiation of various radio equipment was quite actively carried out in the USSR, especially in the last years of its existence. Currently, in a number of CIS countries, theoretical and experimental studies on the creation of MPRS are continuing. It should be noted that similar work in this area of ​​radar is being carried out by domestic specialists. In particular, an experimental bistatic radar "Pole" was created and successfully tested, where radio and television transmitting stations are used as target illumination transmitters.

LITERATURE

1. Jane's Defense Equipment (Electronic Library of Armaments of the Countries of the World), 2006 - 2007.

2. Peter B. Davenport. Using Multistatic Passive Radar for Real-Time Detection of UFO"S in the Near-Earth Environment. - Copyright 2004. - National UFO Reporting Center, Seattle, Washington .

3. H. D. Griffiths. Bistatic and Multistatic Radar. - University College London, Dept. Electronic and Electrical Engineering. Torrington Place, London WC1E 7JE, UK.

4 Jonathan Bamak, Dr. Gregory Baker, Ann Marie Cunningham, Lorraine Martin. Silent Sentry™ Passive Surveillance // Aviation Week&Space Technology. - June 7, 1999. - P.12.

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MILITARY THOUGHT No. 3(5-6)/1997

On some problems of control over compliance with the procedure for the use of airspace

Colonel GeneralV.F.MIGUNOV,

candidate of military sciences

Colonel A.A. GORYACHEV

The STATE has full and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace over its territory and territorial waters. The use of the airspace of the Russian Federation is regulated by laws consistent with international standards, as well as legal documents of the Government and individual departments within their competence.

To organize the rational use of the country's airspace, control air traffic, ensure flight safety, monitor compliance with the procedure for its use, the Unified Air Traffic Control System (EU ATC) was created. Formations and units of the Air Defense Forces, as users of airspace, are part of the control objects of this system and are guided in their activities by uniform regulatory documents for all. At the same time, readiness to repel a sudden attack by an air enemy is ensured not only by the continuous study by the crews of the command posts of the Air Defense Forces of the developing situation, but also by the exercise of control over the procedure for using airspace. The question is legitimate: is there any duplication of functions here?

Historically, in our country, the radar systems of the EU ATC and Air Defense Forces arose and developed to a large extent independently of one another. Among the reasons for this are the differences in the needs of defense and the national economy, the volume of their financing, the large size of the territory, departmental disunity.

Air traffic data in the ATC system is used to develop commands transmitted to aircraft and ensure their safe flight along a pre-planned route. In the air defense system, they serve to identify aircraft who violated the state border, command and control of troops (forces) intended to destroy an air enemy, direct weapons of destruction and electronic warfare at air targets.

Therefore, the principles of construction of these systems, and hence their capabilities, differ significantly. It is essential that the positions of the EU ATC radar facilities are located along the airways and in the areas of airfields, creating a control field with a lower boundary height of about 3000 m. Air defense radio engineering units are located primarily along the state border, and the lower edge of the radar field they create does not exceed the minimum height flight of aircraft of a potential enemy.

The system of control of the Air Defense Forces over the procedure for using airspace took shape in the 1960s. Its base is made up of radio-technical air defense troops, intelligence and information centers (RIC) of the command posts of formations, associations and the Central Command Post of the Air Defense Forces. In the process of control, the following tasks are solved: providing command posts of air defense units, formations and formations with data on the air situation in their areas of responsibility; timely detection of aircraft whose ownership has not been established, as well as foreign aircraft violating the state border; identification of aircraft that violate the procedure for using airspace; ensuring the safety of air defense aviation flights; assistance to EU ATC authorities in assisting aircraft in force majeure circumstances, as well as search and rescue services.

Monitoring the use of airspace is carried out on the basis of radar and air traffic control: radar consists in escorting aircraft, establishing their nationality and other characteristics with the help of radar facilities; control room - in determining the estimated location of aircraft on the basis of the plan (applications for flights, traffic schedules) and reports of actual flights, . coming to the command posts of the Air Defense Forces from the EU ATC and departmental control points in accordance with the requirements of the Regulations on the procedure for the use of airspace.

If radar and air traffic control data are available for the aircraft, they are identified, i.e. an unambiguous relationship is established between the information obtained by an instrumental method (coordinates, movement parameters, radar identification data) and the information contained in the notice of the flight of a given object (flight or application number, tail number, starting, intermediate and final points of the route, etc.) . If it was not possible to identify the radar information with the planning and dispatching information, then the detected aircraft is classified as a violator of the procedure for using the airspace, data about it are immediately transmitted to the interacting ATC unit and measures adequate to the situation are taken. In the absence of communication with the intruder or when the aircraft commander does not follow the instructions of the controller, air defense fighters intercept him and escort him to the designated airfield.

Among the problems that have the strongest impact on the quality of the functioning of the control system, one should first of all name the insufficient development of the legal framework governing the use of airspace. Thus, the process of determining the status of Russia's border with Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in the airspace and the procedure for controlling its crossing was unjustifiably dragged out. As a result of the uncertainty that has arisen, the clarification of the ownership of an aircraft flying from the indicated states ends when it is already in the depths of the territory of Russia. At the same time, in accordance with the current instructions, part of the air defense duty forces is put on alert No. 1, additional forces and means are included in the work, i.e. material resources are being unjustifiably spent and excessive psychological tension is created among combat crew members, which is fraught with the most serious consequences. Partially, this problem is solved as a result of the organization of joint combat duty with the air defense forces of Belarus and Kazakhstan. However, its complete solution is possible only by replacing the current Regulation on the Procedure for the Use of Airspace with a new one that takes into account the current situation.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the conditions for fulfilling the task of monitoring the procedure for using airspace have been steadily deteriorating. This is due to a reduction in the number of radio engineering troops and, as a result, the number of units, and those of them were disbanded first of all, the maintenance and maintenance of combat duty of which required large material costs. But it is precisely these units, located on sea ​​coast, on the islands, hills and mountains, had the greatest tactical significance. In addition, the insufficient level of material support has led to the fact that the remaining units are much more likely than before to lose their combat effectiveness due to the lack of fuel, spare parts, etc. As a result, the ability of the RTV to carry out radar control at low altitudes along the borders of Russia has significantly decreased.

In recent years, the number of airfields (landing sites) that have a direct connection with the nearest Air Defense Forces command posts has noticeably decreased. Therefore, messages about actual flights are received via bypass communication channels with large delays or are not received at all, which sharply reduces the reliability of dispatch control, makes it difficult to identify radar and planned dispatch information, and does not allow the effective use of automation tools.

Additional problems arose in connection with the formation of numerous aviation enterprises and the emergence of aviation equipment in the private ownership of individuals. There are known facts when flights are carried out not only without notification of the Air Defense Forces, but also without the permission of the ATC. At the regional level, there is a disunity of enterprises in the use of airspace. The commercialization of the activities of airlines affects even the presentation of aircraft schedules. A typical situation has become when they demand their payment, and the troops do not have the means for these purposes. The problem is solved by making unofficial extracts that are not updated in a timely manner. Naturally, the quality of control over compliance with the established procedure for the use of airspace is declining.

Changes in the structure of air traffic had a certain impact on the quality of the control system. At present, there is a trend towards an increase in international flights and out-of-schedule flights, and, consequently, the congestion of the corresponding communication lines. If we take into account that the main terminal device of the communication channels at the air defense command post are outdated telegraph devices, it becomes obvious why the number of errors in receiving notices of planned flights, messages about departures, etc. has sharply increased.

It is assumed that the listed problems will be partially resolved as the Federal Airspace Reconnaissance and Control System develops, and especially during the transition to the Unified Automated Radar System (EARLS). As a result of the integration of departmental radar systems, for the first time it will be possible to use a common information model of air traffic by all bodies connected to the EARLS as consumers of air situation data, including command posts of the Air Defense Forces, Air Defense of the Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy, EU ATC centers, and others departmental air traffic control points.

In the process of theoretical study of options for the use of EARLS, the question arose of the advisability of further entrusting the Air Defense Forces with the task of monitoring the procedure for using airspace. After all, the EU ATC authorities will have the same information about the air situation as the crews of the command posts of the Air Defense Forces, and at first glance, it is enough to control only the forces of the EU ATC centers, which, having direct contact with aircraft, are able to quickly understand the situation. In this case, there is no need to transfer to the command posts of the Air Defense Forces a large amount of planning and dispatching information and further identification of radar information and calculated data on the location of aircraft.

However, the Air Defense Forces, being on guard of the air borders of the state, in the matter of identifying aircraft that violate the state border, cannot rely solely on the EU ATC. The parallel solution of this task at the command posts of the Air Defense Forces and at the EU ATC centers minimizes the probability of error and ensures the stability of the control system during the transition from a peaceful situation to a military one.

There is another argument in favor of maintaining the existing order for the long term: the disciplinary influence of the control system of the Air Defense Forces on the EU ATC bodies. The fact is that the daily flight plan is monitored not only by the zonal EU ATC center, but also by the calculation of the control group of the corresponding command post of the Air Defense Forces. This also applies to many other issues related to aircraft flights. Such an organization contributes to the prompt detection of violations of the procedure for the use of airspace and their timely elimination. It is difficult to quantify the impact of the control system of the Air Defense Forces on flight safety, but practice shows a direct relationship between the reliability of control and the level of safety.

In the process of reforming the Armed Forces, objectively, there is a danger of destroying previously created and well-established systems. The problems discussed in the article are very specific, but they are closely related to such major state tasks as border protection and air traffic management, which will be relevant in the foreseeable future. Therefore, maintaining the combat readiness of the radio engineering troops, which form the basis of the Federal System for Intelligence and Control of Airspace, should be a problem not only for the Air Defense Forces, but also for other interested departments.

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I reported to the President that the Aerospace Forces had already received 74 new radar stations in accordance with the army and navy rearmament program adopted in 2012. This is a lot, and at first glance, the state of radar reconnaissance of the country's airspace looks safe. However, serious unresolved problems remain in this area in Russia.

Effective radar reconnaissance and airspace control are indispensable conditions for ensuring the military security of any country and the safety of air traffic in the sky above it.

In Russia, the solution to this problem is entrusted to the radar of the Ministry of Defense and.

Until the early 1990s, the systems of military and civilian departments developed independently and practically self-sufficiently, which required serious financial, material and other resources.

However, the conditions for airspace control became more and more complicated due to the increasing intensity of flights, especially by foreign airlines and small aircraft, as well as due to the introduction of a notification procedure for the use of airspace and the low level of equipping civil aviation with transponders of the unified state radar identification system.

The control over flights in the “lower” airspace (zone G according to the international classification), including over megacities and especially in the Moscow zone, has become more complicated. At the same time, the activities of terrorist organizations that are capable of organizing terrorist attacks using aircraft have intensified.

The appearance of qualitatively new means of observation also has an impact on the airspace control system: new dual-purpose radars, over-the-horizon radars and automatic dependent surveillance (ADS), when, in addition to secondary radar information, parameters are transmitted directly from the aircraft’s navigation instruments from the board of the observed aircraft to the controller, and etc.

In order to streamline all available surveillance equipment, in 1994 it was decided to create a unified system of radar facilities of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport within the framework of the federal system of reconnaissance and airspace control of the Russian Federation (FSR and KVP).

The corresponding decree of 1994 became the first regulatory document that laid the foundation for the creation of the FSR and KVP.

According to the document, it was an interagency dual-use system. The purpose of creating the FSR and the KVP was announced to unite the efforts of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport to effectively solve the problems of air defense and traffic control in Russian airspace.

As work progressed to create such a system from 1994 to 2006, three more presidential decrees and several government decrees were issued. This period of time was spent mainly on the creation of regulatory legal documents on the principles for the coordinated use of civil and military radars (Ministry of Defense and Rosaviatsia).

From 2007 to 2015, work on the FSR and KVP was carried out through the State Armaments Program and a separate federal target program (FTP) "Improvement of the federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation (2007-2015)". The head executor of work on the implementation of the FTP was approved. According to experts, the amount of funds allocated for this was at the level of the minimum allowable, but work has finally begun.

State support made it possible to overcome the negative trends of the 1990s and early 2000s to reduce the country's radar field and create several fragments of a unified automated radar system (ERLS).

Until 2015, the area of ​​airspace controlled by the Russian Armed Forces was growing steadily, while the required level of air traffic safety was maintained.

All the main activities provided for by the FTP were carried out within the established indicators, but it did not provide for the completion of work on the creation of a unified radar system (ERLS). Such a system of reconnaissance and airspace control was deployed only in certain parts of Russia.

At the initiative of the Ministry of Defense and with the support of the Federal Air Transport Agency, proposals were developed to continue the actions of the program that had been launched, but not completed, in order to fully deploy a unified system of intelligence control and airspace control over the entire territory of the country.

At the same time, the "Concept of Aerospace Defense of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2016 and beyond", approved by the President of Russia on April 5, 2006, provides for the full-scale deployment of a unified federal system by the end of last year.

However, the corresponding FTP ended in 2015. Therefore, back in 2013, following the results of a meeting on the implementation of the State Armament Program for 2011-2020, the President of Russia instructed the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport, together with and to submit proposals for amending the Federal Target Program “Improving the federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation (2007- 2015)" with the extension of this program until 2020.

The corresponding proposals were to be ready by November 2013, but Vladimir Putin's order was never fulfilled, and work to improve the federal system of reconnaissance and airspace control has not been funded since 2015.

The previously adopted FTP has expired, and the new one has not yet been approved.

Previously, the coordination of relevant work between the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport was entrusted to the Interdepartmental Commission on the Use and Control of Airspace, formed by presidential decree, which was abolished back in 2012. After the liquidation of this body, there was simply no one to analyze and develop the necessary legal framework.

Moreover, in 2015, the position of general designer was no longer in the federal system of reconnaissance and airspace control. The coordination of the bodies of the SDF and the CVP at the state level has actually ceased.

At the same time, competent experts now recognize the need to improve this system by creating a promising integrated dual-use radar (IRLS DN) and combining the FSR and KVP with an aerospace attack reconnaissance and warning system.

The new dual-purpose system should have, first of all, the advantages of a single information space, and this is possible only on the basis of solving many technical and technological problems.

The need for such measures is also evidenced by the complication of the military-political situation, and the increased threats from aerospace in modern warfare, which have already led to the creation of a new branch of the armed forces - Aerospace.

In the aerospace defense system, the requirements for the FSR and KVP will only grow.

Among them is the provision of effective continuous control in the airspace of the state border along its entire length, especially in the likely directions of attack by means of aerospace attack - in the Arctic and in the southern direction, including the Crimean peninsula.

This necessarily requires new funding for the FSR and CVP through the relevant federal target program or in another form, the re-establishment of a coordinating body between the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport, as well as the approval of new program documents, for example, until 2030.

Moreover, if earlier the main efforts were aimed at solving the problems of airspace control in peacetime, then in the coming period, the tasks of warning about an air attack and information support for combat operations to repel missile and air strikes will become a priority.

- military observer of Gazeta.Ru, retired colonel.
Graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976),
Military Command Academy of Air Defense (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980-1983).
Deputy commander of an anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988).
Senior officer of the main headquarters of the Air Defense Forces (1988-1992).
Officer of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000).
Graduate of the Military Academy (1998).
Browser "" (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the newspaper "Military Industrial Courier" (2010-2015).