Planes 1944. Aviation of the USSR: planes of the second world war

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AIRCRAFT

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Once on the site, we held an Air Parade contest dedicated to the anniversary of the Victory, where readers were asked to guess the names of some of the most famous aircraft of World War II by their silhouettes. The competition has been completed, and now we are publishing photos of these combat vehicles. We offer to remember what the winners and the vanquished fought in the sky.

Germany

Messerschmitt Bf.109

In fact, a whole family of German combat vehicles, the total number of which (33,984 pieces) makes the 109th one of the most massive aircraft of World War II. It was used as a fighter, fighter-bomber, fighter-interceptor, reconnaissance aircraft. It was as a fighter that the Messer earned notoriety from Soviet pilots - at the initial stage of the war, Soviet fighters, such as the I-16 and LaGG, were clearly inferior in technical terms to the Bf.109 and suffered heavy losses. Only the appearance of more advanced aircraft, such as the Yak-9, allowed our pilots to fight with the "Messers" almost on an equal footing. The most massive modification of the machine was the Bf.109G ("Gustav").

Messerschmitt Bf.109

Messerschmitt Me.262

The aircraft was remembered not for its special role in the Second World War, but for the fact that it turned out to be the first-born jet aviation on the battlefield. Me.262 began to design even before the war, but Hitler's real interest in the project awakened only in 1943, when the Luftwaffe had already lost its combat power. The Me.262 possessed speed (about 850 km/h), altitude and rate of climb that were unique for its time, and therefore had serious advantages over any fighter of that time. In reality, for 150 Allied aircraft shot down, 100 Me.262s were lost. The low effectiveness of combat use was due to the "dampness" of the design, little experience in the use of jet aircraft and insufficient training of pilots.

Messerschmitt Me.262

Heinkel-111

Heinkel-111

Junkers Ju 87 Stuka

The Ju 87 dive bomber, which was produced in several modifications, became a kind of forerunner of modern precision weapons, since it threw bombs not from a great height, but from a steep dive, which made it possible to more accurately aim the ammunition. It was very effective in the fight against tanks. Due to the specifics of the application in conditions of high overloads, the car was equipped with automatic air brakes to exit the dive in case of loss of consciousness by the pilot. To enhance the psychological effect, the pilot, during the attack, turned on the "Jericho Trumpet" - a device that emitted a terrible howl. One of the most famous aces pilots who flew the Stuka was Hans-Ulrich Rudel, who left rather boastful memories of the war on the Eastern Front.

Junkers Ju 87 Stuka

Focke-Wulf Fw 189 Uhu

The tactical reconnaissance aircraft Fw 189 Uhu is interesting primarily for its unusual two-beam design, for which the Soviet soldiers nicknamed it "Rama". And it was on the Eastern Front that this reconnaissance spotter turned out to be the most useful to the Nazis. Our fighters knew well that after the "Rama" bombers would fly in and strike at reconnoitered targets. But to shoot down this slow-moving aircraft was not so easy because of its high maneuverability and excellent survivability. When approaching Soviet fighters, he could, for example, begin to describe circles of a small radius, into which high-speed cars simply could not fit.

Focke-Wulf Fw 189 Uhu

Probably the most recognizable Luftwaffe bomber was developed in the early 1930s under the guise of a civilian transport aircraft (the creation of the German Air Force was prohibited by the Treaty of Versailles). At the beginning of World War II, the Heinkel-111 was the most massive Luftwaffe bomber. He became one of the main characters in the Battle of England - it was the result of Hitler's attempt to break the will to resist the British through massive bombing raids on the cities of Foggy Albion (1940). Even then it became clear that this medium bomber was obsolete, it lacked speed, maneuverability and security. Nevertheless, the aircraft continued to be used and produced until 1944.

Allies

Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress

The American "flying fortress" during the war constantly increased its security. In addition to excellent survivability (in the form, for example, of the ability to return to base with one engine out of four), the heavy bomber received thirteen 12.7-mm machine guns in the B-17G modification. A tactic was developed in which "flying fortresses" walked over enemy territory in a checkerboard pattern, protecting each other with crossfire. The aircraft was equipped with a high-tech Norden bombsight for that time, built on the basis of an analog computer. If the British bombed the Third Reich mainly at night, then the "flying fortresses" were not afraid to appear over Germany during daylight hours.

Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress

Avro 683 Lancaster

One of the main participants in the Allied bomber raids on Germany, a British heavy bomber of World War II. The Avro 683 Lancaster accounted for ¾ of the entire bomb load thrown by the British on the Third Reich. The carrying capacity allowed the four-engine aircraft to take on board "blockbusters" - super-heavy concrete-piercing bombs Tallboy and Grand Slam. Low security suggested the use of Lancasters as night bombers, but night bombing was not very accurate. During the day, these aircraft suffered significant losses. Lancasters took an active part in the most devastating bomb raids of World War II - on Hamburg (1943) and Dresden (1945).

Avro 683 Lancaster

North American P-51 Mustang

One of the most iconic fighters of the Second World War, which played an exceptional role in the events on the Western Front. No matter how the Allied heavy bombers defended themselves when raiding Germany, these large, low-maneuverable and relatively slow-moving aircraft suffered heavy losses from German fighter aircraft. North American, commissioned by the British government, urgently created a fighter that could not only successfully fight the Messers and Fokkers, but also have sufficient range (due to external tanks) to accompany bomber raids on the continent. When the Mustangs began to be used in this capacity in 1944, it became clear that the Germans had finally lost the air war in the West.

North American P-51 Mustang

Supermarine Spitfire

The main and most massive fighter of the British Air Force during the war, one of the best fighters of the Second World War. Its high-altitude and speed characteristics made it an equal rival to the German Messerschmitt Bf.109, and the skill of the pilots played an important role in the head-to-head battle of these two machines. Spitfires proved to be excellent, covering the evacuation of the British from Dunkirk after the success of the Nazi blitzkrieg, and then during the Battle of Britain (July-October 1940), when British fighters had to fight like German bombers He-111, Do-17, Ju 87, as well as with Bf. 109 and Bf.110.

Supermarine Spitfire

Japan

Mitsubishi A6M Raisen

At the beginning of World War II, the Japanese carrier-based fighter A6M Raisen was the best in the world in its class, even though its name contained the Japanese word "Rei-sen", that is, "zero fighter". Thanks to the external tanks, the fighter had a high flight range (3105 km), which made it indispensable for participating in raids on the ocean theater. Among the aircraft involved in the attack on Pearl Harbor were 420 A6Ms. The Americans learned lessons from dealing with the nimble, quick-climbing Japanese, and by 1943 their fighter aircraft had surpassed their once dangerous enemy.

Mitsubishi A6M Raisen

The most massive dive bomber of the USSR began to be produced even before the war, in 1940, and remained in service until the Victory. The low-wing aircraft with two engines and double fins was a very progressive machine for its time. In particular, it provided for a pressurized cabin and electric remote control (which, due to its novelty, became the source of many problems). In reality, the Pe-2 was not so often, unlike the Ju 87, used precisely as a dive bomber. Most often, he bombed areas from level flight or from a gentle, rather than deep dive.

Pe-2

The most massive combat aircraft in history (36,000 of these "silts" were produced in total) is considered a true legend of the battlefields. One of its features is a load-bearing armored hull, which replaced the frame and skin in most of the fuselage. The attack aircraft worked at heights of several hundred meters above the ground, becoming not the most difficult target for ground-based anti-aircraft weapons and an object of hunting by German fighters. The first versions of the Il-2 were built single-seat, without a side gunner, which led to rather high combat losses among aircraft of this type. And yet, the IL-2 played its role in all theaters where our army fought, becoming a powerful means of supporting ground forces in the fight against enemy armored vehicles.

IL-2

The Yak-3 was a development of the well-proven Yak-1M fighter. In the process of refinement, the wing was shortened and other design changes were made to reduce weight and improve aerodynamics. This light wooden aircraft showed an impressive speed of 650 km / h and had excellent low-altitude flight characteristics. Tests of the Yak-3 started at the beginning of 1943, and already during the battle on the Kursk Bulge, he entered the battle, where, with the help of a 20-mm ShVAK cannon and two 12.7-mm Berezin machine guns, he successfully opposed the Messerschmites and Fokkers.

Yak-3

One of the best Soviet La-7 fighters, which entered service a year before the end of the war, was a development of the LaGG-3 that met the war. All the advantages of the "ancestor" were reduced to two factors - high survivability and the maximum use of wood in the construction instead of scarce metal. However, the weak engine and heavy weight turned the LaGG-3 into an unimportant opponent of the all-metal Messerschmitt Bf.109. From LaGG-3 to OKB-21 Lavochkin they made La-5, installing a new ASh-82 engine and finalizing the aerodynamics. The modified La-5FN with a boosted engine was already an excellent combat vehicle, surpassing the Bf.109 in a number of parameters. In La-7, the weight was again reduced, and the armament was also strengthened. The plane has become very good, even remaining wooden.

La-7

U-2, or Po-2, created in 1928, by the beginning of the war was certainly a model of obsolete equipment and was not designed at all as a combat aircraft (a combat training version appeared only in 1932). However, in order to win, this classic biplane had to work as a night bomber. Its undoubted advantages are ease of operation, the ability to land outside airfields and take off from small areas, and low noise.

U-2

At low gas in the dark, the U-2 approached the enemy object, remaining unnoticed almost until the moment of bombing. Since the bombing was carried out from low altitudes, its accuracy was very high, and the "corn" inflicted serious damage on the enemy.

The article "Aerial parade of winners and losers" was published in the journal Popular Mechanics (

Having assessed the decisive role of aviation as the main striking force in the struggle for the spread of Bolshevism and the defense of the state, in the very first five-year plan, the leadership of the USSR set a course for the creation of its own, large and autonomous from other countries, military air fleet.

In the 20s, and even in the early 30s, the aviation of the USSR had a fleet of aircraft, mainly of foreign production (only Tupolev aircraft appeared - ANT-2, ANT-9 and its subsequent modifications, which becamelater the legendary U-2, etc.). The aircraft that were in service with the Red Army were multi-brand, had outdated designs and poor technical condition. air routes of the North / research of the Northern Sea Route / and the implementation of government special flights. It should be noted that civil aviationin the pre-war period, it practically did not develop, with the exception of the opening of a number of unique, "demonstrative" airlines or episodic flights of ambulance and service aviation.

In the same period, the era of airships ended, and the USSR builtin the early 30s, successful designs of "soft" (frameless) type "B" airships. Digressing, it should be noted about the development of this type in air navigation abroad.

Germany's famous rigid airshipdesign "Graf Zeppepelin" explored the North, was equipped with cabins for passengers, had a significant range and quitehigh cruising speed/ up to 130 and more km / h, providedseveral motors of the Maybach design. On board the airship were even several dog sledding as part of expeditions to the North. The American airship "Akron" is the largest in the world, with a volume of 184 thousand cubic meters. m carried on board 5-7 aircraft and transported up to 200 passengers, not counting several tons of cargo at a distance of up to 17 thousand km. without landing. These airships were already safe, because. were filled with inert gas helium, and not hydrogen as at the beginning of the century. Low speed, low maneuverability, high cost, the complexity of storage and maintenance predetermined the end of the era of airships. Experiments with balloons came to an end, which proved the unsuitability of the latter for active combat operations. We needed a new generation of aviation with new technical and combat performance.

In 1930, our Moscow Aviation Institute was created - after all, the replenishment of factories, institutes and design bureaus of the aviation industry with experienced personnel was of decisive importance. The old cadres of pre-revolutionary education and experience were clearly not enough, they were thoroughly beaten out, they were in exile or in camps.

Already by the 2nd five-year plan (1933-37), aviation workers had a significant production base, a support for the further development of the air force. fleet.

In the thirties, by order of Stalin, demonstrative, but in fact test, flights of bombers "camouflaged" as civilian aircraft were made. At the same time, aviators Slepnev, Levanevsky, Kokkinaki, Molokov, Vodopyanov, Grizodubova and many others distinguished themselves.

In 1937, the Soviet fighter aviation passed combat tests in Spain and demonstrated a technical lag. AircraftPolikarpov (type I-15,16) were defeated by the latest German machines. The race to the bottom began again. Stalin gave the designersindividual tasks for new aircraft models, widely and generously dividedThere were bonuses and benefits - the designers worked tirelessly and demonstrated a high level of talent and preparedness.

At the March 1939 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilovnoted that, compared to 1934, the Air Force had grown in its personalby 138 percent ... The aircraft fleet as a whole has grown by 130 percent.

Heavy bomber aviation, which was assigned the main role in the upcoming war with the West, has doubled in 4 years, while other types of bomber aviation, on the contrary, have halved. Fighter aviation has increased two and a half times. Altitudeaircraft already amounted to 14-15 thousand meters. The technology for the production of aircraft and engines was put on stream, stamping and casting were widely introduced. The shape of the fuselage changed, the aircraft acquired a streamlined shape.

The use of radio on board aircraft began.

Before the war, great changes took place in the field of aviation materials science. In the pre-war period, there was a parallel development of heavy aircraft of all-metal construction with duralumin skinand light maneuverable aircraft of mixed designs: wood, steel,canvas. With the expansion of the raw material base and the development of the aluminum industry in the USSR, aluminum alloys were increasingly used in aircraft construction. There was progress in engine building. The M-25 air-cooled engines with a capacity of 715 hp, M-100 water-cooled engines with a capacity of 750 hp were created.

In early 1939, the Soviet government called a meeting in the Kremlin.

It was attended by leading designers V.Ya.Klimov, A.A.Mikulin,A.D. Shvetsov, S.V. Ilyushin, N.N. Polikarpov, A.A. Arkhangelsky, A.S. Yakovlev, the head of TsAGI and many others. Possessing a good memory, Stalin was quite well aware of design features aircraft, all important aviation issues were decided by Stalin. The meeting outlined measures for the further accelerated development of aviation in the USSR. Until now, history has not conclusively refuted the hypothesis that Stalin was preparing an attack on Germany in July 1941. It is on the basis of this assumption that the planning of Stalin's attack on Germany (and further to "liberate" the countries of the West), adopted at the "historical" plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in August 1939 and this fact, incredible for that (or any other) time, of the sale of advanced German equipment and technology to the USSR seems to be explainable. A large delegation of Sovietaviation workers, who twice went to Germany shortly before the war, got into their hands fighters, bombers, guidance systems, and much more, which made it possible to dramatically advance the level of domestic aircraft construction. It was decided to increase the combat power of aviation, because it was from August 1939 of the year The USSR began covert mobilization and prepared strikes against Germany and Romania.

Mutual exchange of information on the state of the armed forces of the three states (England, France and the USSR), represented in Moscow in August1939, i.e. before the partition of Poland, showed that the numberfirst-line aircraft in France is 2 thousand pieces. Of these, twoa third were completely modern aircraft. By 1940, it was planned to increase the number of aircraft in France to 3000 units. Englishaviation, according to Marshal Burnet, had about 3,000 units, and the potential for production was 700 aircraft per month.German industry was mobilized only at the beginning1942, after which the number of weapons began to grow sharply.

Of all the domestic fighter aircraft ordered by Stalin, the most successful options were LAGG, MiG and Yak.The IL-2 attack aircraft delivered a lot to its designer Ilyushinneny. Made initially with rear hemisphere protection (double)he, on the eve of the attack on Germany, did not suit the customers of hiswastefulness." S. Ilyushin, who did not know all of Stalin's plans, was forced to change the design to a single-seat version, i.e. bring the design closer to the "clear sky" aircraft. Hitler violated Stalin's plans and the aircraft had to be urgently returned to the original design at the beginning of the war.

On February 25, 1941, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution "Onreorganization of the aviation forces of the Red Army. "The Decree provided for additional measures to re-equip air units. In accordance with the plans for a future war, the task was set to urgently form new air regiments, while equipping them, as a rule, with new machines. The formation of several airborne corps began.

The doctrine of war on "foreign territory" and "little bloodshed" led tothe emergence of a "clear sky" aircraft intended for the unpunishedraids on bridges, airfields, cities, factories. Before the war hundreds of thousands

young men were preparing to transfer to a new one, developed post-Stalincompetition, the SU-2 aircraft, of which it was planned to manufacture 100-150 thousand pieces before the war. This required accelerated training of the corresponding number of pilots and technicians. SU-2 - in its essence the Soviet Yu-87, and in Russia did not stand the test of time, because. There was no "clear sky" for either country during the war.

Air defense zones were formed with fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery. An unprecedented call to aviation began, voluntarily andforcibly. Almost all the few civil aviationwas mobilized in the Air Force. Dozens of aviation schools were opened, incl. super-accelerated (3-4 months) training, traditionally the officer corps at the helm or the control handle of the aircraft was replaced by a sergeant - an unusual fact and testifies to the rush to prepare for the war. Airfields (about 66 airfields) were urgently advanced to the borders, stocks of fuel, bombs, in a special secret, raids on German airfields, on the oil fields of Ploiesti were detailed ...

On June 13, 1940, the Flight Test Institute was formed(LII), in the same period other design bureaus and research institutes were formed.In the war with the Soviet Union, the Nazis assigned a special role to theiraviation, which by this time had already won complete dominance inair in the West. Basically a plan for using aviation in the Eastwas planned the same as the war in the West: first to win the masterin the air, and then transfer forces to support the ground army.

Outlining the timing of the attack on the Soviet Union, the Nazi commandThe government set the following tasks for the Luftwaffe:

1.Sudden strike on Soviet airfields to defeatSoviet aviation.

2. To achieve complete air supremacy.

3. After solving the first two tasks, switch aviation to support the ground forces directly on the battlefield.

4. Disrupt the work of Soviet transport, make it difficult to transfertroops both in the front line and in the rear.

5. Bomb large industrial centers - Moscow, Gorky, Rybinsk, Yaroslavl, Kharkov, Tula.

Germany dealt a crushing blow to our airfields. Only for 8hours of the war, 1200 aircraft were lost, there was a mass deathflight personnel, storages and all stocks were destroyed. Historians noted the strange "crowding" of our aviation at airfields the day beforewar and complained about the "mistakes" and "miscalculations" of the command (i.e. Stalin)and evaluation of events. In fact, "crowding" portends planssuper-massive strike on targets and confidence in impunity, which did not happen. Air Force flight crews, especially bombers, suffered heavy losses due to the lack of support fighters, there was a tragedy of the death of perhaps the most advanced and powerful air fleet inthe history of mankind, which was to be revived anew under the blows enemy.

It must be admitted that the Nazis managed to implement their air war plans in 1941 and the first half of 1942 to a large extent. Almost all available forces were thrown against the Soviet Union G Nazi aviation, including units removed from the Western Front. Atit was assumed that after the first successful operations, part of the bombsinterception and fighter formations will be returned to the Westfor the war with England. At the beginning of the war, the Nazis had not only numerical superiority. Their advantage was that the flightthe cadres who took part in the air attack have already been seriouslynew school of fighting with French, Polish and English pilots. On thetheir side also had a fair amount of experience interacting with their troops,acquired in the war against the countries of Western Europe.Old types of fighters and bombers, such as the I-15,I-16, SB, TB-3 could not compete with the latest Messerschmitts and"Junkers". Nevertheless, in the unfolding air battles, even on the lipsthe dead types of aircraft, Russian pilots inflicted damage on the Germans. From 22June to July 19, Germany lost 1300 aircraft only in the air battles.

Here is what the German General Staff officer Greffat writes about this:

" Behind the period from June 22 to July 5, 1941, the German air forcelost 807 aircraft of all types, and for the period from 6 to 19 July - 477.

These losses indicate that despite the surprise achieved by the Germans, the Russians managed to find the time and strength to provide decisive opposition. ".

On the very first day of the war, fighter pilot Kokorev distinguished himself by ramming an enemy fighter, the feat of the crew is known to the whole worldGastello (the latest research on this fact suggests that the ramming crew was not Gastello's crew, but was the crew of Maslov, who flew with Gastello's crew to attack enemy columns), who threw his burning car onto a cluster of German vehicles.Despite the losses, the Germans in all directions brought into battle everythingnew and new fighters and bombers. They have thrown the front4940 aircraft, including 3940 German, 500 Finnish, 500 Romanianand achieved complete air supremacy.

By October 1941, the Wehrmacht armies approached Moscow, were busycities supplying components for aircraft factories, the time has come for the evacuation of factories and design bureaus of Sukhoi, Yakovlev and others in Moscow, Ilyushin inVoronezh, all the factories of the European part of the USSR demanded the evacuation.

The release of aircraft in November 1941 was reduced by more than three and a half times. Already on July 5, 1941, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR decided to evacuate from the central regions of the country part of the equipment of some aircraft instrument factories to duplicate their production in Western Siberia, and after a while a decision had to be made to evacuate the entire aircraft industry.

On November 9, 1941, the State Defense Committee approved the schedules for the restoration and start-up of evacuated factories and production plans.

The task was not only to restore the production of aircraft,but also significantly increase their quantity and quality. In December1941of the year, the aircraft production plan was completed by less than 40percent, and motors - only 24 percent.In the most difficult conditions, under bombs, in the cold, the cold of Siberian wintersbackup factories were launched one after another.technologies, new types of materials were used (not at the expense of quality), women and teenagers stood up for the machines.

Lend-lease deliveries were also of no small importance for the front. Throughout the Second World War, 4-5 percent of the total production of aircraft and other weapons produced in the USA was delivered to aircraft. However, a number of materials and equipment supplied by the USA, England, were unique and indispensable for Russia (varnishes, paints, other substances, devices, tools, equipment, medicines, etc.), which cannot be characterized as "minor" or secondary.

The turning point in the work of domestic aircraft factories came around March 1942. At the same time, the combat experience of our pilots grew.

Only during the period from November 19 to December 31, 1942, in the battles for Stalingrad, the Luftwaffe lost 3,000 combat aircraft. Our aviation becameact more actively and showed all its combat power in the NorthernCaucasus. Heroes of the Soviet Union appeared. This title was awardedboth for downed aircraft and for the number of sorties.

In the USSR, the squadron "Normandie-Niemen" was formed, staffed by volunteers - the French. Pilots fought on Yak planes.

The average monthly production of aircraft rose from 2.1 thousand in 1942 to 2.9 thousand in 1943. In total, in 1943, the industryproduced 35 thousand aircraft, 37 percent more than in 1942.In 1943, factories produced 49,000 engines, almost 11,000 more than in 1942.

Back in 1942, the USSR overtook Germany in the production of aircraft - the heroic efforts of our specialists and workers and the "complacency" or unpreparedness of Germany, which did not mobilize the industry in advance under the conditions of war, affected.

In the Battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943, Germany used significant amounts of aircraft, but the power of the Air Force ensured air supremacy for the first time.

By 1944, the front received about 100 aircraft daily, incl. 40 fighters.The main combat vehicles were modernized. Aircraft appeared withimproved combat qualities of Yak-3, Pe-2, Yak 9T, D, LA-5, IL-10.German designers also modernized aircraft. Appeared"Me-109F, G, G2", etc.

By the end of the war, the problem of increasing the range of fighter aircraft arose - the airfields could not keep up with the front. The designers proposed the installation of additional gas tanks on aircraft, and jet weapons began to be used. Radio communications developed, radar was used in air defense. So, on April 17, 1945, bombers of the 18th Air Army in the area of ​​Koenigsberg made 516 sorties in 45 minutes and dropped 3743 bombs with a total weight of 550 tons.

In the air battle for Berlin, the enemy took part in 1500 painful aircraft based on 40 airfields near Berlin. In history, this is the most aircraft-saturated air battle, and one should take into account the highest level of combat training on both sides.The Luftwaffe fought aces who shot down 100,150 or more aircraft (a record300 downed combat aircraft).

At the end of the war, the Germans used jet aircraft, which significantly exceeded propeller-driven aircraft in speed - (Me-262, etc.). However, this did not help either. Our pilots in Berlin made 17,500 sorties and completely defeated the German air fleet.

Analyzing military experience, we can conclude that our aircraft, developed in the period 1939-1940. they had constructive reserves for subsequent modernization. It should be noted in passing that not all types of aircraft were put into service in the USSR. For example, in October 1941, the production of MiG-3 fighters was stopped, and in 1943, the production of IL-4 bombers.

The aviation industry of the USSR produced 15,735 aircraft in 1941. In the difficult year of 1942, in the conditions of evacuation of aviation enterprises, 25,436 aircraft were produced, in 1943 - 34,900 aircraft, in 1944 - 40,300 aircraft, in the first half of 1945 20,900 aircraft were produced. Already in the spring of 1942, all factories evacuated from the central regions of the USSR beyond the Urals and Siberia, they fully mastered the production of aviation equipment and weapons. Most of these factories in new places in 1943 and 1944 produced several times more products than before the evacuation.

The success of the rear made it possible to strengthen the country's Air Force. By the beginning of 1944, the Air Force and aground 8818 combat aircraft, and German - 3073. In terms of the number of aircraft, the USSR surpassed Germany by 2,7 ​​times. By June 1944, the German Air Forcealready had only 2,776 aircraft at the front, and our Air Force - 14,787. By the beginning of January 1945, our Air Force had 15,815 combat aircraft. The design of our aircraft was much simpler than that of American, German or British aircraft. This partly explains such a clear advantage in terms of the number of aircraft. Unfortunately, it is not possible to compare the reliability, durability and strength of our and German aircraft, as well as to analyze the tactical and strategic use of aviation in the war of 1941-1945. Apparently, these comparisons would not be in our favor and would conditionally reduce such a striking difference in numbers. Nevertheless, perhaps, the simplification of the design was the only way out in the absence of qualified specialists, materials, equipment and other components for the production of reliable and high-quality equipment in the USSR, especially since, unfortunately, in the Russian army they traditionally take "number" and not skill .

Aviation armament was also improved. in 1942, a large-caliber 37 mm aircraft gun was developed, later appearedand a 45 mm cannon.

By 1942, V.Ya. Klimov developed the M-107 engine instead of the M-105P, which was adopted for installation on water-cooled fighters.

Greffoat writes: “Counting on the fact that the war with Russia, like the war in the West, would be lightning fast, Hitler assumed, after achieving the first successes in the East, to transfer bomber units, as well asthe required number of aircraft back to the West. The East mustwere to remain air connections intended for directsupport of the German troops, as well as military transport units and a certain number of fighter squadrons ... "

German aircraft, created in 1935-1936, at the beginning of the war, no longer had the possibility of radical modernization. According to German General Butler "The Russians had the advantage that in the production of weapons and ammunition they took into account all the featureswaging war in Russia and the simplicity of technology was ensured as much as possible. As a result, Russian factories produced great amount weapons, which were distinguished by great simplicity of design. Learning to wield such a weapon was relatively easy... "

The Second World War fully confirmed the maturity of domestic scientific and technical thought (this, in the end, ensured further acceleration of the introduction of jet aircraft).

Nevertheless, each of the countries went its own way in designing aircraft.

The aviation industry of the USSR produced 15,735 aircraft in 1941. In the difficult year of 1942, in the conditions of the evacuation of aviation enterprises, 25,436 aircraft were produced, in 1943 - 34,900 aircraft, for1944 - 40,300 aircraft, 20,900 aircraft were produced in the first half of 1945. Already in the spring of 1942, all factories evacuated from the central regions of the USSR beyond the Urals and to Siberia fully mastered the production of aviation equipment and weapons. Most of these factories were in new places in 1943 and 1944 years gave products several times more than before the evacuation.

In addition to its own resources, Germany possessed the resources of the conquered countries. In 1944, German factories produced 27.6 thousand aircraft, and our factories produced 33.2 thousand aircraft in the same period. In 1944, the production of aircraft exceeded the figures of 1941 by 3.8 times.

In the first months of 1945, the aviation industry was preparing technicians for the final battles. So, the Siberian Aviation Plant N 153, which produced 15 thousand fighters during the war, in January-March 1945 transferred 1.5 thousand modernized fighters to the front.

The success of the rear made it possible to strengthen the country's Air Force. By the beginning of 1944, the Air Force had 8818 combat aircraft, and the German - 3073. In terms of the number of aircraft, the USSR surpassed Germany by 2.7 times. By June 1944, the German Air Forcealready had only 2,776 aircraft at the front, and our Air Force - 14,787. By the beginning of January 1945, our Air Force had 15,815 combat aircraft. The design of our aircraft was much simpler than American, Germanor English cars. This partly explains such a clear advantage in terms of the number of aircraft. Unfortunately, it is not possible to compare the reliability, durability and strength of our and German aircraft, butalso analyze the tactical and strategic use of aviation in the war of 1941-1945. Apparently these comparisons would not be inour favor and conditionally reduce such a striking difference in numbers. Nevertheless, perhaps, the simplification of the design was the only way out in the absence of qualified specialists, materials, equipment and other components for the production of reliable and high-quality equipment in the USSR, especially since, unfortunately, in the Russian army they traditionally take "number" and not skill .

Aviation armament was also improved. in 1942, a large-caliber 37 mm aircraft gun was developed, later a 45 mm caliber gun appeared. By 1942, V.Ya. Klimov developed the M-107 engine to replace the M-105P, which was adopted for installation on water-cooled fighters.

The fundamental improvement of the aircraft is its transformationchange from propeller to jet. To increase flight speedput a more powerful engine. However, at speeds over 700 km/hspeed gain from engine power cannot be achieved. Exithouse out of position is the application of traction.Applicableturbojet / turbojet / or liquid-propellant / rocket engine / engine.the second half of the 30s in the USSR, England, Germany, Italy, later - inThe United States intensively created a jet aircraft. In 1938, lanes appeared.the world's highest, German BMW jet engines, Junkers. In 1940made test flights of the first Campini-Capro jet aircraftnor", created in Italy, later the German Me-262, Me-163 appearedXE-162. In 1941, the Gloucester aircraft with a jet was tested in England.engine, and in 1942 they tested a jet aircraft in the USA - "Airokomet". In England, a twin-engine jet aircraft "Metheor", who took part in the war. In 1945, on the plane "MeTheor-4" was set a world speed record of 969.6 km / h.

In the USSR, in the initial period, practical work on the creation of reactorsactive engines was carried out in the direction of the rocket engine. Under the guidanceS.P.Koroleva., A.F.Tsander designers A.M.Isaev, L.S.Dushkindesignedhoisted the first domestic jet engines. The pioneer of the turbojetactive engines was A.M. Lyulka.At the beginning of 1942, G. Bakhchivandzhi made the first flight to the jetactive domestic aircraft. Soon this pilot diedduring aircraft testing.Work on the creation of a practical jet aircraftresumed after the war with the creation of the Yak-15, MiG-9 using notGerman jet engines YuMO.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the Soviet Union entered the war with numerous but technically backward fighter aircraft. This backwardness was, in essence, an inevitable phenomenon for a country that had only recently embarked on the path of industrialization, which the Western European states and the United States had already traveled in the 19th century. By the mid-20s of the 20th century, the USSR was an agrarian country with a half-illiterate, mostly rural population and a meager percentage of engineering, technical and scientific personnel. Aircraft building, engine building and non-ferrous metallurgy were in their infancy. Suffice it to say that in tsarist Russia they did not produce ball bearings and carburetors for aircraft engines, aircraft electrical equipment, control and aeronautical instruments at all. Aluminium, wheel tires and even copper wire had to be purchased abroad.

Over the next 15 years, the aviation industry, along with related and raw material industries, was created almost from scratch, and simultaneously with the construction of the world's largest air force at that time.

Of course, with such a fantastic pace of development, serious costs and forced compromises were inevitable, because it was necessary to rely on the available material, technological and personnel base.

In the most difficult situation were the most complex science-intensive industries - engine building, instrumentation, radio electronics. It must be admitted that the Soviet Union was unable to overcome the lag behind the West in these areas during the pre-war and war years. The difference in "starting conditions" turned out to be too great, and the time allotted by history was too short. Until the end of the war, we produced engines created on the basis of foreign models purchased back in the 30s - Hispano-Suiza, BMW and Wright-Cyclone. Their repeated forcing led to an overstrain of the structure and a steady decrease in reliability, and, as a rule, it was not possible to bring their own promising developments to mass production. The exception was the M-82 and its further development, the M-82FN, thanks to which, perhaps, the best Soviet fighter during the war, the La-7, was born.

During the war years, they were unable to establish in the Soviet Union the serial production of turbochargers and two-stage superchargers, multifunctional propulsion automation devices, similar to the German "commandogerat", powerful 18-cylinder air-cooled engines, thanks to which the Americans overcame the milestone in 2000, and then in 2500 hp Well, by and large, no one was seriously engaged in work on water-methanol boosting of engines. All this severely limited aircraft designers in creating fighters with higher flight performance than the enemy.

No less serious restrictions were imposed by the need to use wood, plywood and steel pipes instead of scarce aluminum and magnesium alloys. The insurmountable weight of the wooden and mixed construction made it necessary to weaken the armament, limit the ammunition load, reduce the fuel supply and save on armor protection. But there was simply no other way out, because otherwise it would not even be possible to bring the flight data of Soviet aircraft closer to the characteristics of German fighters.

For a long time, our aircraft industry compensated for the lag in quality due to quantity. Already in 1942, despite the evacuation of 3/4 of the production capacities of the aviation industry, 40% more combat aircraft were produced in the USSR than in Germany. In 1943, Germany made significant efforts to increase the production of combat aircraft, but nevertheless the Soviet Union built more of them by 29%. Only in 1944, the Third Reich, through the total mobilization of the resources of the country and occupied Europe, caught up with the USSR in the production of combat aircraft, but during this period the Germans had to use up to 2/3 of their aviation in the West, against the Anglo-American allies.

By the way, we note that for every combat aircraft produced in the USSR, there were 8 times fewer machine park units, 4.3 times less electricity and 20% fewer workers than in Germany! Moreover, more than 40% of the workers in the Soviet aviation industry in 1944 were women, and over 10% were teenagers under 18 years old.

These figures indicate that Soviet aircraft were simpler, cheaper and more technologically advanced than German ones. Nevertheless, by the middle of 1944, their best models, such as the Yak-3 and La-7 fighters, surpassed the German machines of the same type and contemporary with them in a number of flight parameters. The combination of sufficiently powerful engines with high aerodynamic and weight culture made it possible to achieve this, despite the use of archaic materials and technologies designed for simple production conditions, outdated equipment and low-skilled workers.

It can be objected that in 1944 these types accounted for only 24.8% of the total production of fighters in the USSR, and the remaining 75.2% were older types with worse flight performance. One can also recall that the Germans in 1944 were already actively developing jet aircraft, having achieved considerable success in this. The first samples of jet fighters were launched into mass production and began to enter combat units.

Nevertheless, the progress of the Soviet aircraft industry during the difficult war years is undeniable. And his main achievement is that our fighters managed to win back low and medium heights from the enemy, on which attack aircraft and short-range bombers operated - the main strike force of aviation on the front line. This ensured the successful combat work of the "silt" and Pe-2 on German defensive positions, concentration of forces and transport communications, which, in turn, contributed to the victorious offensive of the Soviet troops at the final stage of the war.

A unique document from the "For Official Use" category describing the design and operation of the YuMO-004B jet engine, the last and most advanced Nazi German military aircraft "Messerschmitt-262" at that time in the world. In the last months of the war, it was with this aircraft that Hitler and Goering hoped for a turning point in the “air war”, during which the Reich suffered one defeat after another, were connected. However, the tests and mass production of the Me-262 were started too late due to the short-sightedness of the Luftwaffe leadership, led by Ernst Udette and Goering's deputy Erhard Milch. The document was developed by the team of the so-called "Bureau of New Technology" of the Ministry of Aviation Industry of the USSR in 1946. Each copy of this document had its own registration number - in our case, No. 233. A similar document issued by the same bureau was devoted to the fuselage and aerodynamic qualities of the aircraft (not in our collection). Original, condition according to age. The full version of the document is in .

The German fighter Me-262 is considered by many experts to be one of the best military aircraft that took part in the Second World War. If the leaders of the Third Reich had assessed its capabilities and combat potential in time, victory in Europe would have gone to the allies at a much higher price. However, the short-sightedness of Hitler, the unprofessionalism of the Luftwaffe commander Hermann Goering, bureaucratic delays turned this first jet fighter in the history of the air war into a kind of "paria" in the detachment of combat aircraft. But how unsuccessful and short was his fate of the Me-262, so amazing was the post-war history of the ideas of jet aviation embedded in it.

THE LAST HOPE OF THE FUHRER

This aircraft had its own mission from the very beginning. Along with the “weapon of retaliation” (an atomic bomb) hastily developed by German scientists, the Messerschmitt-262 was considered as a “weapon of salvation” of the Third Reich from total defeat by the Allies. Under the influence of the Imperial Minister of Propaganda J. Goebbels, whose opinion was shared by many generals of the German High Command, Germany owed its defeats on the fronts primarily to the unprofessionalism of the commander of the air force, Hermann Goering, who was unable to protect the sky and the cities of the Reich from the devastating raids of the Allied aviation. Many believed that if the German Luftwaffe managed to become the master of the situation in the air, a decisive turning point could come in the course of the war. And the main hope in this matter was placed on the new jet Messerschmitt.

In the notes of Joseph Goebbels, which he punctually kept throughout the war, the theme of the jet Me-262 pops up constantly, and in the last weeks of the war it sounds like a spell: “In accordance with the availability of gasoline, all types of aircraft will be withdrawn from our weapons program, with the exception of five. The main attention, according to the decision of the Fuhrer, will be given to the production of ME-262.<…>“Direct hits from the ME-262 just tear the mosquito apart. It takes four hits to bring down such a bomber. In a month of such battles, the Anglo-American enemy must suffer such significant losses that he will have to limit his activity in the air.<…>“Now the Fuhrer has great hopes for jet fighters. He even calls them "the machines of German destiny". He believes that thanks to jet aircraft, it will be possible - at least by defensive actions - to undermine enemy air superiority.<…>“Now the Führer places the greatest hopes on new jet aircraft. This month, 500 of them will already be produced, and next - 1000. Airfields for them can be built with great difficulty.<…>“The Führer pins all his hopes on the use of these new jets. The enemy will not be able to oppose them in the air with anything significant.

All these are records dated March and April 1945, when the outcome of the Second World War was no longer in doubt. Already in the last days of the war, when the Soviet troops stood at the walls of Berlin, six commissioners were appointed at Hitler's headquarters to implement the Me-262 accelerated production program. The management of the program was entrusted to two trusted combat generals - Josef Kammhuber, who was responsible for the production of night fighters, and Dietrich Peltz, who was responsible for the production of day fighters. The Third Reich was dying, but the order to recruit 20 thousand cadets went to flight schools, who were to take to the air on the planes of the "German hope".

The German jet fighter "Messerschmitt-262" had another name - Schwalbe, which means "Swallow". Its flight advantages were already demonstrated in the first battle - on July 25, 1944, in the sky over Munich, the new Messerschmitt practically smashed the Mosquito English high-speed bomber to shreds. However, the Third Reich did not have enough time to produce a sufficient number of "miracle aircraft". And although from 1944 to 1945, 1433 Me-262 jet fighters were assembled and transferred to the front at German aircraft factories, which also became the most massive jet aircraft of the Second World War, he failed to fulfill his original mission. Perhaps due to the fact that the path of the new plane into the sky turned out to be surprisingly difficult.

LONG ROAD TO SKY

The idea of ​​creating a jet fighter aircraft in Germany was born almost simultaneously with the development of a turbojet engine (TRD). It should be noted that in the 1930s, the complexity of creating a turbojet engine, as one of the most science-intensive finished products of an aircraft, was considered the greatest. In addition, the very idea of ​​transonic aircraft was perceived with some skepticism, since the then existing wind tunnels did not allow determining the characteristics of such high-speed aircraft. For the first time, the development of a pursuit aircraft under the designation R-1065 began in October 1938. It was planned to install two R3302 jet engines with a thrust of 600 kgf each. It was expected that a fighter with these turbojet engines would be able to reach speeds of up to 900 km/h. The appearance of the aircraft was not formed immediately and its evolution is in many ways similar to the development of flora and fauna: from simple to complex. In addition, the new aircraft could fly "on the slop", as aircraft designers joked - that is, it did not require special high-purity aviation gasoline. At the end of the war, when Germany lost access to oil, this proved to be an important argument in his favor.
Based on the dimensions of the turbojet engine, which was manufactured at the BMW plant, the German aircraft designer Willy Messerschmitt approved the first version of the future Me-262. The unusual combination of fuselage contours and the bearing surface (the Me-262 was equipped with the so-called "swept" wing) was a step towards the integral layout of the aircraft, which, as you know, was widely used in the creation of fourth-generation combat aircraft. The design of the aircraft was developed in such a way that each part was easy to manufacture and could be manufactured at various enterprises. A large shortage of aluminum alloys forced the designers, to the detriment of the weight of the airframe, to widely use steel and wood in the airframe design.

The first flight of a jet fighter, piloted by one of the best pilots in Germany, Wendel, took place on March 25, 1942 and almost ended in disaster. The plane slowly gained a height of 50 meters, and when the pilot began to remove the landing gear, the left turbojet engine failed, and a little later, the right one. The pilot managed to turn the car around and successfully land it on the airfield. This was a result of the poor reliability of early turbojets. However, in the meantime, the Heinkel plant completed testing of the Junkers Jumo 004 A engine, which developed a thrust of 840 kgf. These engines were installed on the Me-262 and continued testing.

In total, three prototypes were produced, and its tests did not go very smoothly. April 18, 1942 experienced Me-262 crashed, the pilot died. All this threatened that the idea of ​​a jet fighter could be abandoned altogether, but the situation was saved by one of the best test pilots in Germany, Adolf Galland. He comprehensively tested the aircraft in the air and on the ground, and a few days later reported to Reichsmarschall Goering that “this machine is a real smile of Fortune! It gives us an advantage as long as the opponents use piston-engined aircraft. This aircraft opens a new page in combat use. Galland proposed some technical improvements in the design of the fighter, in particular, from now on all Me-262s were equipped - for the first time in the history of fighter aircraft - with ejection seats for emergency evacuation of pilots in case of damage to the machine. By the way, before the end of the war, this saved the lives of 70 Luftwaffe pilots, whose high-speed fighters were shot down or damaged.

Goering himself was infected by the enthusiasm of the pilots. The Luftwaffe was rapidly losing air supremacy, and the appearance of a new "indestructible" aircraft was supposed to improve the reputation of Goering himself. However, he did not immediately succeed in convincing Hitler that the Me-262 should become that “wonder weapon”. Even then, Hitler treated Goering and the entire Luftwaffe with such great distrust that he personally wanted to verify the effectiveness of the new technology. He demanded obligations and guarantees from engineers, designers and specialists, which they could not give. When the designer Messerschmitt himself arrived at headquarters with a report on the new aircraft, Hitler attacked him with reproaches, not allowing him to say a word. He ordered to continue testing on a few prototypes, and because of this whim of the Fuhrer, preparation for mass production of one of the best aircraft of the Second World War was delayed by almost a year!

Not only the choleric temperament of the German Fuhrer played a role, but also his attitude to questions of strategy. Defense in Hitler's eyes was a secondary matter. Where the Luftwaffe was concerned, he listened only to what pertained to offensive operations; he was deaf to the needs of air defense. When, in late August 1944, Speer and Galland personally drew his attention to the vital need to concentrate German fighter power in the defense of the Reich, Hitler simply threw them out the door, shouting that they must obey his orders. In turn, Goering never objected to Hitler, but only passed down the destructive orders of the Führer down the chain of command. In relation to honored pilots, he sometimes behaved completely insultingly. At one of the meetings, Goering began to talk about how the German fighter pilots received too many awards that they did not deserve. Galland, who was present at the meeting, upon hearing this, turned pale, tore off the Knight's Cross and threw it noisily on the Reich Minister's table. There was an icy silence, but Goering left it without consequences. At the very end of the war, Galland, who was, in fact, one of the creators of combat jet fighter aircraft, was sent to Italy with an unspoken order not to return to Germany until the end of the war. He survived, and in 1953 he wrote his memoirs, in which he spoke in detail, including about the history of the creation of the Me-262.

BATTLE OF THE DOOMED

Meanwhile, the situation on the fronts was rapidly deteriorating, and already in November 1943, the Nazi leaders again remembered the “miracle plane”. Its construction was hastily included in the armaments program and given emergency powers to organize speedy production. Goering personally visited the Messerschmitt factories to get acquainted with the progress of work on the Me-262. True, now there was another hitch: Hitler proposed converting the Me-262 into a jet bomber, which would require a complete redesign, hanging bomber sights and hangers for bombs. This could slow down the production of the aircraft for a long time, since the jet fighter, according to its flight data and visibility from the cockpit, was generally not suitable for targeted bombing.

And a few weeks later, the German aviation industry was overtaken by a large-scale disaster: in February 1944, Allied aviation conducted targeted mass raids on German aircraft factories (the so-called “Big Week” operation). As a result, more than 100 Me-262 aircraft were destroyed at the factories in Augsburg and Regensburg, many technicians and workers were killed. The production of jet aircraft was urgently transferred to the depths of Germany, to Leipheim, however, even there, on April 24, the final assembly workshops were destroyed by a powerful daytime raid by American bombers ...

Jet "Messers" began to enter the troops only in the fall of 1944. The first squadron of jet fighters was assigned to form one of the best German aces, Walter Nowotny, who had 250 downed aircraft to his credit and was one of the most productive fighter pilots of the Reich. In the air town of Achmer near Osnabrück, the creation of the first unit of jet fighters, called the 7th Fighter Squadron (JG-7), began. Novotny personally selected pilots for his squadron and staffed it with the best fighter aces that the Luftwaffe had at that time. The “baptism of fire” of the “bomber hunters” was to be taken on the Western Front, which suffered especially from Allied air raids. The pilots noted that the Me-262 was much easier to control than the main Luftwaffe fighter Messerschmitt-109 (Gustav). True, the Me-262 accelerated worse, but on a dive it could easily go beyond the speed limits. In addition, a jet fighter flew quite well on one engine, while its speed reached 450-500 km / h. The duration of its flight at an altitude of 7000 meters reached 2.25 hours. The armament of the fighter consisted of four 30-mm MK 108A-3 cannons with 100 rounds of ammunition for the upper guns and 80 for the lower ones. The choice of such guns indicated that the aircraft was intended to fight enemy bombers, and there was no talk of any maneuverable combat with fighters. According to the German historian K. Becker, “with this weaponry, the pilots of the JG-7 squadron destroyed 45 four-engine bombers and 15 fighters accompanying them in the last week of February 1945.” For example, on March 17, several Me-262s from Group III took off to intercept B-17s bombing Ruland, Bohlen and Cottbus. In that battle, non-commissioned officer Koster shot down two Flying Fortresses, and Ober-Lieutenant Wegmann and Ober-Sergeant Gobel shot down one each.

Basically, the Me-262 fought in the West, but there were also clashes with Soviet pilots. The first battles between Soviet aircraft and the Me-262 showed the vulnerability of Soviet aircraft to German jet ones. At the end of February 1945, Soviet pilots even received a special order - to open fire on the Me-262 without waiting for the approach, from a distance of 600 meters. However, some Soviet aces - for example, the famous Ivan Kozhedub and Evgeny Savitsky - managed to shoot down Messerschmitt-262. Alexander Pokryshkin also encountered the Me-262, but could not bring it down. It also happened that the Soviet pilot managed to shoot down the Me-262, but the command did not believe him. This happened to fighter pilot Major Okolelov, who shot down a Messerschmitt-262 in the last days of April 1945 near the Breslau-Berlin highway. The downed plane crashed in difficult terrain, and the command simply did not believe the Soviet pilot. Only many years later he managed to prove his case - and even then thanks to the memoirs of an English pilot who witnessed this battle and wrote about him in his memoirs. The Soviet command believed the Englishman.

The tremendous advantage that jet fighters had over piston-engined machines was best demonstrated on April 7, 1945. On this day, the Luftwaffe, acting according to the "Wehrwolf" (werewolf) plan, directed its attacks not as usual against the bombers, but against the escort of the fighters accompanying them. Having suffered no noticeable losses, JG-7 reported twenty-eight enemy fighters shot down. On the other hand, on the same day, American P-51 Mustang fighters staged a deadly hunt for the German Messerschmitt-109 and Focke-Wulf-190. The military diary of the US I Air Corps speaks of the loss of at least 133 German aircraft and the death of seventy-seven pilots.

It was the last great air battle in the skies over Europe. A few days later, the Me-262 pilots had to relocate to an airfield in Prague, very distant for active participation in hostilities. And the courage and steadfastness of individual pilots could no longer prevent the military defeat of Nazi Germany. Thus ended the combat history of the Me-262. Developed before the war, ignored for years and almost banned by Germany's top military leader, the German jet fighter remains a shining symbol of German ingenuity even in times of crisis, although its impact on the outcome of the war was negligible. A significant part of the built Me-262s died during the Anglo-American air raids, many of them never managed to take to the skies.

FALCONS VS SWALLOWS

Of course, the Kremlin knew that the Germans had a jet fighter, and were waiting for an opportunity to get at least one copy of this miracle of German engineering. In the USSR, in general, they were just as zealous about the achievements of the Germans in the military aircraft industry, as in Germany - to the characteristics of Soviet tanks. The rivalry between Russian and German pilots unfolded during the First World War (see note) and continued during the years of the Spanish confrontation (see note). Perhaps it was in Spain that the most sensitive blow was dealt to the pride of the Soviet military aircraft industry. Despite the incredible efforts of the USSR, German aviation reigned supreme in the Spanish sky, completely wiping the Spanish city of Guernica off the face of the earth as a demonstration of its power. And this despite the fact that the USSR did not skimp on expenses, trying to bring its aircraft closer to the battlefields in Spain. Nowadays, few people know that the Cuevas del Canelobre Caves, which became a tourist attraction in the city of Alicante, were used in 1936 as a hangar for the assembly and shelter of Polikarpov's Soviet aircraft - multi-purpose U-2 biplanes (known in the West as Po-2). Work on equipping this natural cave, pouring concrete, making a giant tunnel (which still serves as the entrance to the cave), as well as laying almost three kilometers of a mountain road, took Soviet military specialists less than a year.

Today only specialists know about this episode of the war in Spain. On the Canelobre cave itself, there is not a single pointer to what happened here in the years civil war. And in the USSR itself, they tried not to remember the war in Spain once again. Only occasionally - and even then through an oversight - did the Soviet press publish materials on this topic, as shown in the illustration below - which just shows Polikarpov's planes in the sky of Spain.

However, the Soviet pilots also had one more tooth against the German aces. The fact is that many of them in the 20s and 30s, bypassing the terms of the Versailles Treaty, studied in the USSR and even were graduates of higher military educational institutions: the future chief of staff of the Supreme High Command, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, Field Marshal Walter Model, Field Marshal Walter von Brauchitsch, General Manstein, Kruse, Horn, Faige, Hitler's adjutant from the Air Force, Colonel Nicholas von Below and many others. And the future developer of the Luftwaffe military aviation, aircraft designer Hugo Junkers, also lived in Moscow in the late 1920s, where he trained at the design bureau of Andrei Tupolev. And although many of them did not share the idea of ​​war with the USSR in their hearts, they all applied their experience gained during their studies in the USSR in the war. So, in the memoirs of Nicholas von Belov, an interesting dialogue is given that took place between him and Hitler back in 1939, when the Fuhrer asked his adjutant what experience he had learned from his studies in the USSR. In response, von Below said that once, when German pilots were carrying out bombing exercises in the Lipetsk region (where they studied at the local secret aviation school), one of the bombs exploded in a field where local boys were grazing horses. Both children and horses died, but the Soviet authorities billed the German command only for horses. Not a word was said about the dead children. From this case, von Below drew a conclusion, which he shared with Hitler: “In a war, Russians will not count people ...”

Of course, such treachery did not add love to the German pilots from the Soviet military. It is known that in many parts of the German pilots were not even taken prisoner alive. The technical superiority of German aircraft, which had developed by the beginning of the war, was evened out by the middle of it. The new Soviet fighters, as well as Soviet tanks, were not inferior, and in many respects even surpassed the enemy. And then, out of nowhere, the Me-262, practically inaccessible to Soviet aircraft. It was necessary to urgently study a new car - but for this it had to be obtained somewhere. Such an opportunity presented itself only in April 1945. Then the chief sergeant major Helmut Lennartz from the same 7th fighter squadron was forced to commit emergency landing in the territory occupied by Soviet troops. At the same time, the engines of his aircraft received additional damage from the earth that got into them. After that, the car got to the Soviet troops, it was taken to the Air Force Research Institute and repaired under the guidance of the chief engineer - I. G. Rabkin. Then it was repainted in the colors of the Soviet military aviation, the swastika on the tail was replaced with a red star, and the car was handed over for flight tests.

A little later, units of the 16th Air Army captured more than 20 Me-262 jet fighters at the airfields in Oranienburg, Dalgov, and later in Berlin Tempelhof. General Savitsky came to “run in” the captured jet car. He took to the air in a two-seat fighter, assisted him in flight by a German captured pilot. The aircraft were transported to the Air Force Research Institute, where Soviet specialists got acquainted with their design. Our pilots knew that repeatedly jet "Messers" were pulled into a dive at high speed and the German pilots crashed along with the machines, so the candidate for testing was selected especially carefully. The first Soviet pilot to fly the Me-262 was Andrey Kochetkov. On September 15, 1945, he launched a test flight on the repaired Schwalbe. Until November 1945, he completed 17 more flights, for which he received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. During the tests, the same unpleasant features were revealed when flying at high speeds that German specialists had previously encountered. When trying to reach a maximum speed of 870 km / h, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled dive. Fortunately for the pilot, this happened at an altitude of 11,000 m, and with great difficulty Kochetkov still managed to save the car. Until the end of the summer of 1945, the Air Force Research Institute managed to test the gas turbine Jumo 004 on domestic low-octane gasoline, and another turbojet engine, the BMW 003, on tractor kerosene.

Meanwhile, in the occupied areas of Germany, Soviet and American specialists were on a real hunt for military-technical documentation and all kinds of "know-how" of German industry. In April 1945, employees of the army counterintelligence arrested in Berlin the chief technical adviser on jet aircraft, engineer E. Puruker. A few days later, the head of the GRU, General F. Kuznetsov, informed the Minister of Aviation Industry of the USSR A. Shakhurin: “The prisoner E. Puruker is of great interest to you, as he is widely aware of the production of jet engines for aircraft in Germany. The prisoner is in Moscow and can be provided for special interrogation by your representative.” It was from Puruker that it became known exactly where the technical documentation for the Me-262 and other experimental Luftwaffe aircraft was stored. Special teams were sent for the drawings, who carefully searched the design offices in Ceske Budejovice, Wiener Neustadt and Bergkristall east of Linz. A high-ranking engineer also reported on a secret airfield in the vicinity of Prague, where about 60 aircraft were based. Puruker turned out to be a very valuable informant, because it was he who spoke about the technical difficulties that the Germans encountered in the process of "bringing to mind" their jet "Swallows". He also clarified that the German aircraft industry reached the largest number of Me-262 production in March 1945, having received 237 aircraft from the conveyors.

Numerous messages from German pilots, engineers, high-ranking aviation officials increased interest in the jet Messerschmitt in the Soviet Union. The captured aircraft were sent to aircraft factories in Syzran and to the experimental sites of the Air Force Research Institute, where specialists carefully studied each node. In the conclusion of the act, based on the results of flight tests, it was noted, in particular, that the Me-262 is a finished jet aircraft and has a great advantage in maximum horizontal speed over modern domestic and foreign fighters with piston engines. Deputy People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry P.V. Dementiev, having received the first results of flight tests of a captured fighter, sent a letter to the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars G.M. Malenkov with a proposal to immediately begin mass production of Soviet jet aircraft based on the Me-262. It was planned to organize the production of the aircraft at factories No. 381 in Moscow and No. 292 in Saratov. The study of the design of the aircraft, the production of drawings and adaptations of the aircraft for Soviet equipment and weapons was entrusted to the chief designer of the department Myasishchev, and the development of engines was entrusted to the designer Klimov. Vladimir Mikhailovich Myasishchev, having carefully studied the design of the Me-262, also noted in his report: “I must note that this aircraft, according to the recall of the Civil Aviation Research Institute of the Air Force, has a number of operationally proven designs, such as a three-wheeled landing gear, cabin pressurization, etc., has good handling characteristics , allows the installation of very powerful weapons and its use as an attack aircraft, has a proven double training version and the possibility of further increasing the maximum flight speed (up to 900-960 km / h) and range (up to 1200 km). At the same time, equipping the Air Force with spacecraft with jet aircraft (in single-seat and two-seat training versions) can begin from the middle of 1946.

However, the famous aircraft designer Alexander Yakovlev turned out to be a fierce opponent of this idea. In his book The Purpose of Life, he wrote: “At one of the meetings with Stalin, when discussing the work of the aviation industry, the proposal of People's Commissar Alexei Shakhurin on the serial production of the captured Messerschmitt-262 jet fighter captured by our troops was considered. During the discussion, Stalin asked if I was familiar with this aircraft and what was my opinion. I replied that I know the Me-262 aircraft, but I object to launching it in our series, because it is a bad aircraft, difficult to control and unstable in flight, which had suffered a number of accidents in Germany. If it enters service with us, it will scare our pilots away from jet aircraft. They will quickly see from their own experience that this aircraft is dangerous and, moreover, has poor takeoff and landing properties. I also noticed that if we copy the Messerschmitt, then all attention and resources will be mobilized on this machine, and we will cause great damage to work on domestic jet aircraft ... ”After further discussion, the proposal to copy the Me-262 was rejected. Although the Soviet history of the German jet "Messerschmitt" did not end there. In preparation for the November 1946 parade over Red Square, the Air Force proposed to use the Me-262 at the rate of 5-6 flights for each to train pilots selected to fly the first jet MiG-9 and Yak-15. For the training of pilots, it was supposed to overtake 20 Me-262 aircraft to the airfield of the 16th Air Army in Chkalovskaya. However, this proposal did not pass: the first Soviet jet fighters, the famous MIG-9, were designed for one pilot, and our pilots would have to be retrained from the German “sparks”.

The final "point" in the issue of copying German jet aircraft was put by life itself. On September 17, 1946, during a test flight at the Chkalovsky airfield near the village of Kishkino in the Moscow region, one of the German Messerschmitt-262 crashed, burying test pilot F.F. Demid under its wreckage. From that moment on, the final decision was made - not to copy the "Germans", to develop their own. Nevertheless, the Me-262 left a deep mark on Soviet aviation. It's just not customary to talk about it.

TROPHY AVIATION INDUSTRY

In fact, this is one of the carefully hushed up topics of post-war Soviet history - how exactly Soviet science, the military-industrial complex and industry disposed of the engineering "legacy of the enemy", which we inherited at the end of the war. During the fighting in Germany, the Soviet occupation zone included areas in which many aviation enterprises were concentrated - mainly large aircraft manufacturing concerns like Junkers, Arado, Heinkel, Focke-Wulf, Dornier. Most of the factories were badly damaged by aerial bombardments, many turned into ruins. Aircraft designers and developers of a new military equipment- Prandtl, Betz, Busemann, Georgi, Heinkel, Lippisch and others. However, even what the winners got could be enough for many years with thoughtful and serious study. Therefore, almost simultaneously with the start of the fighting on the territory of the Third Reich, a special scientific and technical council (STC) was created in Moscow, which immediately after the war was transformed into the Bureau of New Technology - it was it that issued the document presented in our collection. Professors, academicians, leading scientists were mobilized to work in the NTS, whose task was to "determine the scientific and technical policy for the further development of the army and navy", or, in other words, to use the captured military-technical and scientific potential of Germany to the maximum for needs of Soviet industry. Thousands of pages of drawings and texts, product samples, descriptions of experiments, scientific literature were delivered to Moscow in a continuous stream. Hundreds of translators from German were recalled from the front and retrained as specialists in scientific and technical translation. In parallel, in Germany itself, everything that was of even the slightest value was being dismantled. By the middle of 1946, 123,000 machine tools and other industrial equipment had been exported from Germany to the USSR. This made it possible to create nine new aircraft factories in the Soviet Union, including two aircraft and three engine factories.

Naturally, special attention was paid to the latest models of weapons - jet aircraft, rocket technology, nuclear projects ... Although Stalin, Voroshilov, Budyonny before the war did not believe in the power of new developments in the field of weapons and spoke contemptuously about missiles, the experience of the war taught them a lot. In March 1945, when the war was still rumbling, but the fate of Germany had already been decided, the State Defense Committee issued a decree on the export of documentation and equipment on radars from German factories for their production in the USSR. Soon the State Defense Committee issued a decision "On sending a commission to remove equipment and study the work of the German Rocket Institute in Peenemünde." We are talking about the enterprise where the German "miracle weapon" - V-1 and V-2 was created. Academician Georgy Byushgens wrote: “After the end of the war in 1945, TsAGI scientists and other aviation specialists had the opportunity to get acquainted with the captured materials of aviation research from the German DVL Institute in the city of Adlershof. These materials contained, in addition to the results of tests in the wind tunnels of the institute, models of specific aircraft, and general data.
Trophy materials scientists of TsAGI - Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute named after N.E. Zhukovsky - was not immediately appreciated. However, many specialists of the institute quickly realized the promise of this direction. Further theoretical and experimental studies were entrusted to a team of the most authoritative scientists of the institute. In addition to technical documentation, Soviet specialists found unfinished samples of Me-162 single-engine jet fighters, three damaged He-280 twin-engine jet fighters. Soviet exercises studied enemy developments. Here is a quote from one of the reports: “The development of jet technology in Germany has taken on a large scale in recent years. Captured samples of German jet technology available in the USSR - jet aircraft (fighters, attack aircraft, bombers), aviation jet gas turbine engines, liquid-propellant jet engines, radio-controlled and unguided rockets (long-range and for combating anti-aircraft targets), projectiles and radio-guided glide bombs from aircraft show that the introduction of jet technology in aviation, navy and artillery was carried out in Germany on a large scale, and the Germans had serious success in this area.

To study enemy achievements and the possibility of their use in the USSR, by the decision of the government in the summer of 1945, an interdepartmental Commission on jet technology was created under the GKO. In August 1945, bench tests of German jet engines were carried out. At the pilot plant No. 51, the production of 10X projectiles, similar to the German V-1 cruise missile, began. In the same 1945, the idea arose to use German specialists for the development of jet aviation in the USSR. The People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry Shakhurin turned to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks with a secret letter. It stated in particular: “A large number of German specialists and scientists in the field of aviation are now in our hands. These scientists and specialists have vast reserves of knowledge accumulated during their work in research and experimental organizations in Germany ... From our point of view, it would be advisable to have on the territory of the USSR or in the zone of Germany occupied by us a special type of organization with special treatment(under the supervision of the NKVD), where German scientists could conduct research work - according to our instructions ... ".
This was immediately reported to Stalin, and the go-ahead was obtained to use the "enemy's legacy" in order to develop the domestic military industry. The search for and involvement of German specialists in cooperation took place in various ways. Some, for example, the former head of the experimental production of the Junkers company, Dr. B. Baade, voluntarily expressed a desire to cooperate in order to continue working in aviation. The leading specialist in aerodynamics of the Heinkel company, Z. Günther, also turned to the Soviet authorities. Many were driven by mercantile considerations - money and food rations. Some scientists, having heard about the atrocities of the NKVD, were simply afraid to refuse.
In total, more than a thousand German scientists were involved in the work. They were collected in Berlin, Dessau, Leipzig, Halle, Strasfurt and Rostock. Everyone made a report on the past activities of the scientific institution and spoke about their work. Having become acquainted with these materials, Soviet specialists gave their resumes and set new tasks for the "trophy" scientists. The completed work was sent to the People's Commissariat of the Aviation Industry, to research institutes and enterprises for a more complete study for use in their future work.
At the end of August 1946, the most valuable and promising German specialists were transferred to the USSR. There were about seven thousand of them. Aircraft builders were assembled at the pilot plant No. 1 in the village of Podberezye, Kimrsky district, on the shores of the Moscow Sea. Specialists in turbojet engines and instruments were sent to Pilot Plant No. 2, located near Kuibyshev. Scientists involved in engines took their jobs at enterprises near Moscow - plant No. 500 in Tushino and No. 456 in Khimki. It is still not known exactly what contribution the German teachings made to the development of the Soviet aircraft industry and how many ideas they suggested to their colleagues from the USSR. However, one can guess that the contribution of 7 thousand of the best minds of the German aviation industry to the development of Soviet military-technical thought turned out to be very significant. Perhaps it was these and similar developments that became the main military trophy of Russia. A trophy that allowed a dilapidated country to turn into a world superpower in a matter of years - with the best aviation and weapons in the world ...